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Psychological assessmentMental imagery is an under-explored ﬁeld in clinical psychology research but presents a topic of potential in-
terest and relevance across many clinical disorders, including social phobia, schizophrenia, depression, and
post-traumatic stress disorder. There is currently a lack of a guiding framework from which clinicians may
select the domains or associated measures most likely to be of appropriate use in mental imagery research.
We adopt an interdisciplinary approach and present a review of studies across experimental psychology
and clinical psychology in order to highlight the key domains and measures most likely to be of relevance.
This includes a consideration of methods for experimentally assessing the generation, maintenance, inspec-
tion and transformation of mental images; as well as subjective measures of characteristics such as image viv-
idness and clarity. We present a guiding framework in which we propose that cognitive, subjective and
clinical aspects of imagery should be explored in future research. The guiding framework aims to assist re-
searchers in the selection of measures for assessing those aspects of mental imagery that are of most rele-
vance to clinical psychology. We propose that a greater understanding of the role of mental imagery in
clinical disorders will help drive forward advances in both theory and treatment.
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Mental imagery is the simulation or re-creation of perceptual
experience (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Pearson, 2007) across
sensory modalities. Such imagery has been shown to play a key role in
various psychological disorders, including post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD) (Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005), social phobia (Hackmann,
Clark, & McManus, 2000; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006), prospective
imagery in schizophrenia (D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden,
2008), and depression (Patel et al., 2007). We have argued that the
exploration of mental imagery represents a new and important arena
within clinical psychopathology (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy, & Holmes,
2011; Hackmann & Holmes, 2004; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Pearson,
2007, 2012).
The main purpose of the present review is to provide a broad
framework for clinical researchers from which they can select useful
measures to assess the key domains of mental imagery in clinical psy-
chology. The experimental psychology literature onmental imagery is
extensive and a considerable array of different measures have been
reported to measure different abilities within the sphere of mental
imagery (Logie, 1995; Pearson, 2007; Pearson, De Beni, & Cornoldi,
2001). However, surprisingly few reviews have been conducted of
these measures to date, and those which have been published tend
to be limited to only one or two aspects of imagery ability. For exam-
ple, the review by White, Sheehan, and Ashton (1977) surveys only
self-report measures of imagery, while that by McAvinue and
Robertson (2008) focuses only on measures of motor imagery. A fur-
ther review by McAvinue and Robertson (2007) explores self-report
and objective measures but focuses on visual imagery and does not
consider the clinical relevance of the measures. To our knowledge,
no English-language review has yet been conducted of the key do-
mains of mental imagery and the associated experimental tasks
which may be most relevant in the ﬁeld of clinical psychology.
There is a need to establish the primary cognitive and clinical do-
mains of mental imagery of interest to clinicians and researchers.
There is also a need to identify the tasks which may be used to estab-
lish the extent to which any of these mental imagery domains may be
impaired, distorted or even enhanced in different psychological
disorders.
Mental imagery has featured prominently in current theoretical ac-
counts of disorders such as PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996;
Ehlers & Clark, 2000), social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997), and bipolar disorder (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, &
Goodwin, 2008). Mental imagery processesmay also underlie the effec-
tiveness of clinical treatments such as “imagery re-scripting” in Cogni-
tive Behaviour Therapy (e.g. Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007), schema
focussed therapy (e.g. Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006), and cognitive bias
modiﬁcation training (e.g. Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh,
2006). The rationale for conducting the current review is therefore
that amore thorough assessment of mental imagery in clinical psychol-
ogy will help advance understanding of underlying mental imagery
processes across a range of psychological disorders, and this in turn
will help drive forward advances in both theory and treatment. In this
review we discuss the key processes described in the computational
theory of imagery proposed by Stephen Kosslyn and colleagues, and
consider the experimental tasks that may be used to effectively assess
these processes (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis,
2006). The computational theory was derived frommainstream exper-
imental psychology to account for the broader process of mentalimagery; therefore, it does not speciﬁcally address emotional aspects of
mental imagery, but rather the everyday use and experience of mental
imagery. Theseprocesses consist of image generation; imagemaintenance;
image inspection; and image transformation. In Section 2 we outline our
strategy for conducting the literature review and describe selection
criteria adopted for inclusion of different mental imagery measures. In
Section 3 we discuss the experimental literature in relation to four main
stages of mental imagery (generation, maintenance, inspection, and
transformation), and in relation to its general use and experience. In
Section 4 we review recent research in clinical psychology that has
utilised mental imagery measures in the assessment of different psycho-
logical disorders. In Section 5 we critically review measures and proce-
dures judged most relevant for assessment of key domains of mental
imagery, and from which clinicians and experimental psychologists may
select tasks as appropriate for the population under investigation. Finally,
in Section 6 we propose a guiding framework that highlights the broad
domains of imagery assessment shown to be most important in research
to date.
2. Method
2.1. Literature search strategy
Published studies were identiﬁed through searches of Psychologi-
cal Abstracts (PsycINFO) and ISI Web of Knowledge (All databases)
using keyword, title and abstract information. The initial search
term ‘mental imagery’ returned 8838 articles. The search was then
further reﬁned using the terms ‘imagery measures’; ‘imagery assess-
ment’; ‘imagery’ combined with ‘clinical’; and ‘imagery’ combined
with ‘subjective’. ‘Imagery’ and ‘image’ were also searched in combi-
nation with ‘generation’, ‘maintenance’, ‘inspection’, and ‘transforma-
tion’. Related searches were carried out using the terms ‘visual
working memory’ and ‘spatial working memory’ based on evidence
for overlap between these constructs and mental imagery processes
(for discussion see Section 3.2). In addition, the lists of references
from review papers, book chapters, and other relevant articles were
consulted to identify further items. Only English-language articles
were considered. Unpublished studies or studies published in non
peer-reviewed journals were excluded from the search.
All relevant peer-reviewed published studies in English were then
evaluated for inclusion. The criteria adopted for selecting imagery mea-
sures were based on (a), whether a study assessed a speciﬁc cognitive
stage of mental imagery (as deﬁned in Section 3); and/or (b), whether
a study reported signiﬁcant ﬁndings for mental imagery within the
context of clinical psychology (as outlined in Section 4). Evaluation
using these criteria identiﬁed 65 relevant studies presenting measures
assessing speciﬁc cognitive stages of imagery (Table 1), 19 studies with
measures assessing general imagery use and experience (Table 2), and
28 studies withmeasures assessing speciﬁc clinical aspects ofmental im-
agery (Table 3).
2.2. Inclusions and omissions
In an attempt to balance critical thoroughness with overall manage-
ability our review focuses predominantly on mental imagery assess-
ment in relation to PTSD, schizophrenia, social phobia, depression, and
bipolar disorder (as discussed in Section 4). These disorders are
not presented as exhaustive, and are highlighted on the basis that the
literature associated with the disorders has particular relevance for
Table 1
Summary of experimental tasks to assess the four cognitive stages of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006).
Domain Task Author Format
Generation Image Generation Task Original: Podgorny and Shepard (1978)
Variant: Kosslyn et al. (1988)
Variant: Dror and Kosslyn (1994)
Computerised
Mental Clocks Task Original: Paivio (1978)
Variant: Grossi et al. (1989)
Verbal/pen and paper
Familiar Squares Description Test Original: Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978)
Variant: Bartolomeo et al. (1994)
Variant: Rode et al. (2010).
Verbal/pen and paper
Buildings Task Original: Nori and Giusberti (2006)
Variant: Palermo et al. (2010)
Verbal/pen and paper
Maintenance Image Maintenance Task Original:Kosslyn et al. (1990);
Dror and Kosslyn (1994)
Computerised
Visual Patterns Test Original: Della Sala et al. (1997, 1999) Computerised/pen and
paper
Change Detection Task Original: Luck and Vogel (1997) Computerised
Visual Short-Term Memory Precision Original: Bays and Husain (2008)
Variant: Bays et al. (2009)
Computerised
Complex Span Tasks Original: Russell et al. (1996)
Variant: Alloway et al. (2006)
Computerised
Image Duration Tasks Original: Cocude and Denis (1986, 1988) Computerised/pen and
paper
Inspection Image Scanning Task Original: Finke and Pinker (1983)
Variant: Dror et al. (1993)
Variant: Borst and Kosslyn (2010)
Computerised
Map Scanning Tasks Original: Kosslyn et al. (1978)
Variant: Mellet et al. (2002)
Computerised/ pen and
paper
Letter Corner Classiﬁcation Task Original: Brooks (1968)
Variant: Baddeley et al. (1975)
Variant: Farah et al. (1988)
Pen and paper
Size Comparison of Paired Animals Task Original: Moyer (1973) Computerised/pen and paper
Animals' Tail Test: Original: Farah et al. (1989);
Behrmann et al. (1994)
Pen and paper
Straight/Curved Letter Task Original: Coltheart et al. (1975)
Variant: Policardi et al. (1996);
Holmes et al. (2011)
Pen and paper
Mental Hue Comparison Task Original: De Vreese (1991) Pen and paper
Top/Bottom Larger Letter Task Original: Policardi et al. (1996) Pen and paper
Objects Form Task Original: Mehta et al. (1992)
Variant: Aleman et al. (2005);
Noordzij et al. (2007)
Pen and paper
Transformation and
Manipulation:
Mental Rotation
Image Rotation Task Original: Shepard and Metzler (1971)
Variant: Cooper (1975)
Variant: Cooper and Shepard (1973)
Variant: Dror and Kosslyn (1994)
Variant: Wright et al. (2008)
Pen and paper/
computerised
Manikin Task Original: Ratcliff (1979) Pen and paper
Rotation Arrow Span Task Original: Shah and Miyake (1996) Computerised
Transformation and
Manipulation:
Rrestructuring
and Reinterpretation
Component Detection Task Original: Reed and Johnson (1975)
Variant: Verstijnen, Hennessy et al. (1998);
Verstijnen, van Leeuwen et al. (1998)
Computerised
Interpretation of Ambiguous Figures Original: Chambers and Reisberg (1985)
Variant: Mast and Kosslyn (2002);
Reisberg and Chambers (1991)
Pen and paper
Image Combination and Subtraction Original: Brandimonte et al. (1992a,b,c) Pen and paper
Transformation and
Manipulation:
Mental Synthesis
Image combination Original: Finke et al. (1989)
Variant: Behrmann et al. (1994)
Pen and paper
Creative synthesis Original: Finke and Slayton (1988)
Variant: Anderson and Helstrup (1993)
Variant: Helstrup and Anderson (1996)
Variant: Pearson et al. (1999)
Pen and paper
Temporal Integration Task Original: Brockmole et al. (2002)
Variant: Lewis et al. (2011)
Computerised
4 D.G. Pearson et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 33 (2013) 1–23evaluating the importance of mental imagery assessment in clinical
psychology. We acknowledge there are other clinical disorders
which could be discussed in relation to mental imagery, including
craving (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2004), stroke
(Nilsen, Gillen, DiRusso, & Gordon, 2012), multiple sclerosis
(Heremans et al., 2012) and eating disorders (Tatham, 2011),
amongst others.Our review also focuses on providing an integrative analysis of
studies dealing with the visual and spatial aspects of mental imagery,
as historically these are the domains most extensively researched
across the imagery literature (Kosslyn et al., 2006; Pearson, 2007;
Pearson et al., 2001). Practical considerations mean that assessment
of the literature on mental motor imagery is beyond the scope of
the current review, although we recognise its importance in relation
Table 2
Summary of tasks to assess general imagery use and experience.
Domain Task Author
Experience, content, and
occurrence of imagery
Betts' Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery
Short-form (QMI)
Betts (1909)
Sheehan (1967)
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) Marks (1973)
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) Reisberg et al. (2003)
Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS) Tellegen (1982)
Mental Imagery Interview Original: Hackmann et al. (2000)
Variant: Morrison et al. (2002)
Variant: Day et al. (2004)
Variant: Holmes, Crane et al. (2007)
Variant: Hales et al. (2011)
Variant: Crane et al. (2012)
Controllability of imagery Controllability of Visual Imagery Questionnaire Richardson (1994)
Perspective Observer vs. Field Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) Hackmann et al. (1998)
Wells et al. (1998)
Stopa and Bryant (2004)
Imagery versus verbal
processing style
Verbaliser–Visualiser Questionnaire (VVQ)
Revised VVQ
Richardson (1977)
Kirby et al. (1988)
Visualiser–Verbaliser Cognitive Style Questionnaire Kozhevnikov et al. (2005)
Predominance of Verbal and Imagery-based Thoughts
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh,
and Dalgleish (2008)
5D.G. Pearson et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 33 (2013) 1–23to clinical disorders such as anorexia nervosa (Guardia et al., 2010),
stroke (Liepert, Greiner, Nedelko, & Dettmers, 2012), and spastic
hemiplegia (Williams, Anderson, Reid, & Reddihough, 2012). We
note that existing reviews of the mental motor imagery literature
have been provided by McAvinue and Robertson (2008), Holmes
and Calmels (2008) and Olsson and Nyberg (2010).
3. Cognitive stages of mental imagery
This section describes cognitive stages of mental imagery derived
from a computational theory of imagery and high-level visual percep-
tion proposed by Stephen Kosslyn and colleagues (Kosslyn, 1980,
1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006). Following the computational approachTable 3
Summary of tasks used to assess clinical aspects of imagery.
Domain Task Author
Re-experiencing Script driven imagery procedures Origina
Varian
Varian
Varian
Varian
Intrusions/
ﬂashbacks
Impact of Event Scale Origina
Impact of Event scale—Revised Origina
Intrusion Triggering Task Origina
Varian
Intrusion Diaries Origina
Varian
Origina
Intrusions Interview Origna
Prospective
Imagery
Impact of Future Events Scale Origina
Autobiographical Memory and
Future Cueing Task
Origina
Varian
Prospective Imagery Task Origina
Varian
Bias in Imagery Cognitive Bias Modiﬁcation Task Origina
Varian
Varian
Varian
Varian
Ambiguous Sentences Test Origina
Homograph Interpretation Task Origina
Varian
Variandescribed by Marr (1982), Kosslyn's theory aims to establish which
cognitive systems and processes are necessary in order to produce
the patterns of behaviour associated with the generation and manip-
ulation of mental images. The computational approach aims to under-
stand cognition in terms of the processing subsystems that carry out
data-transforming computations in a “systematic, informationally in-
terpretable way” (Kosslyn, 1987, p. 150). The model provides a com-
prehensive account of the processes and subsystems that underlie the
functioning of mental imagery in the brain, and has been widely inﬂu-
ential in experimental cognitive psychology, and in neuropsychologi-
cal investigations of how imagery maps on to different structures of
the brain (Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2012; Slotnick, Thompson, &
Kosslyn, 2012).Format
l: Lang et al. (1983)
t: Pitman et al. (2002)
t: Lanius et al. (2001, 2002)
t: Rauch et al. (1996)
t: Shin et al. (1997)
Verbal
l: Horowitz et al. (1979) Pen and paper
l: Weiss and Marmer (1997) Pen and paper
l: Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, and Deeprose (2009)
t: Lang et al. (2009)
Computerised
l: Davies and Clark (1998)
t: Holmes et al. (2004)
l: Holmes et al. (2005)
Pen and paper
Verbal
l: Patel et al. (2007) Verbal
l: Deeprose and Holmes (2010) Pen and paper
l: Williams et al. (1996)
t: D'Argembeau et al. (2008)
Verbal
l: Stöber (2000)
t: Holmes, Lang, Moulds, and Steele (2008)
Pen and paper
l: Holmes et al. (2006)
t: Holmes, Lang, and Shah (2009)
t: Blackwell and Holmes (2010)
t: Steel et al. (2010)
t: T.J. Lang et al. (2012)
Computerised
l: Berna, Vincent, et al. (2011) Computerised
l: Hertel et al. (2003)
t: Holmes, Lang et al. (2008)
t: Holmes et al. (2011)
Pen and paper/
Computerised
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There are two distinct routes bywhichmental imagery can be creat-
ed within consciousness (Pearson, 2007). First of all an image can be
created directly from immediate perceptual information. For example,
someone can look at a picture of a horse, create a mental image of the
picture in their mind, and then maintain this mental image as they
look away or close their eyes. Second, an image can be created entirely
from previously stored information held in long-term memory. For ex-
ample, someone can hear the word “horse” and then create mental im-
agery based on their previous experience of what a horse looks like.
Previous studies have demonstrated that there can be signiﬁcant cogni-
tive differences in performance between imagery generated from either
short-termor long-termmemory (Hitch, Brandimonte, &Walker, 1995;
Pearson & Logie, 2004). For example, Cornoldi, De Beni, Guisberti, and
Massironi (1998) report that the colour of geometric patterns is less ac-
curately retained in mental images generated from long-term memory
in comparison to short-term memory. While visual and auditory mental
images are usually reported as being the most frequently experienced
(Betts, 1909; Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005), other sensory modalities in-
clude olfactory imagery (Stevenson & Case, 2005), gustatory imagery
(Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005), and haptic imagery (Juttner & Rentschler,
2002).
Imagery can result from both deliberate and involuntary recall pro-
cesses; in experimental psychology the focus has typically been on delib-
erately generated imagery whereas in psychopathology, the focus has
typically been on involuntary imagery which comes to mind unbidden.
According to the computational theory of imagery proposed by Kosslyn
(1980, 1994); Kosslyn et al., 2006) voluntary mental imagery is often
generated in order to make explicit geometric properties of an object
such as its size. For example, if asked to decide whether an elephant pos-
sesses a long or short tail many people report deliberately visualizing the
appearance of an elephant from memory (Farah, Hammond, Levine, &
Calvanio, 1988). Mental images are generated within a topographically
organised area of the brain known as the visual buffer (Kosslyn, 1980,
1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006). Different categories of imagery can also be
generated, such as general images, speciﬁc images, and autobiographical
or episodic images (Cornoldi & Rossana, 1998; Gardini, Cornoldi, De Beni,
& Venneri, 2009). Studies also suggest that the generation of images of
whole objects may engage different processes than imagining speciﬁc
parts of an object (Farah, 1988; Li et al., 2010). Deﬁcits in image genera-
tion ability have been linked to conditions including representational ne-
glect (Palermo, Piccardi, Nori, Giusberti, & Guariglia, 2010), congenital
blindness (Eardley & Pring, 2006), depression (Zarrinpar, Deldin, &
Kosslyn, 2006), and attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (Abraham,
Windmann, Siefen, Daum, & Gunturkun, 2006).
3.2. Image maintenance
Once generated, a mental image is subject to rapid decay with an
average duration of only 250 ms, which corresponds to the time neces-
sary to make an eye movement (Kosslyn, 1994). This brief duration
means that active maintenance of the image is required in order for
any inspection or transformation processes to be performed. In Kosslyn's
computational theory of imagery, such maintenance is achieved by the
re-activation of visual memory representations in an Object Properties-
Processing subsystem (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn et al., 2006). This
subsystem is responsible for analysing object properties such as shape
and colour and it plays a role during both visual perception and mental
imagery.Maintenance processes have beendemonstrated formental im-
ages generated from both long-term memory (Cocude & Denis, 1988)
and short-term memory (Watkins, Peynircioglu, & Brems, 1984).
Even with active maintenance people can struggle to hold a men-
tal image clearly in mind for more than a few seconds (Cocude,
Charlot, & Denis, 1997; Cocude & Denis, 1988; Pazzaglia & Cornoldi,
1999). Kosslyn et al. (2006) have argued that this brief duration ofgenerated images results from them sharing the same topographical-
ly organised areas of occipital cortex that are used during visual per-
ception. One consequence of this shared neural substrate is the
occurrence of mutual interference between visual imagery and visual
perception, with several studies demonstrating that imagery can be
disrupted by concurrent visual processing (e.g. Baddeley & Andrade,
2000; McConnell & Quinn, 2004; Quinn & McConnell, 2006). Howev-
er, it is still the case that imagery can effectively be experienced
alongside competing perceptual input. For example, there is no evi-
dence for any consistent difference in the reported vividness of im-
ages experienced under ‘eyes-open’ and ‘eyes-closed’ conditions
(Isaac & Marks, 1994; McKelvie, 1995).
Image maintenance may also be dependent upon general attention-
al resources that become rapidly depleted (Logie, 1995; Pearson, 2007;
Pearson et al., 2001). Studies have shown that themaintenance of visual
mental imagery places considerable demands upon general-purpose at-
tentional resources (Logie & Salway, 1990; Pearson, Logie, & Green,
1996; Salway & Logie, 1995). Based on this, Pearson, Logie, and
Gilhooly (1999) have argued that image maintenance may better be
considered a function of the central executive component of working
memory rather than as a separate visually-based process. Some evi-
dence suggests that even involuntarily experienced mental images
place demands upon general attention-based working memory re-
sources. An early study conducted by Bexton et al. showed that involun-
tary visual imagery associated with sensory deprivation could be
dispelled by asking participants to perform demanding cognitive tasks
such asmental arithmetic (Bexton, Heron, & Scott, 1954).More recently
concurrent mental arithmetic has also been shown to signiﬁcantly
reduce the experienced vividness and emotionality of mental images
for a traumatic memory (Bexton et al., 1954; Engelhard, van den Hout,
& Smeets, 2011). Indeed, in clinical practice, involuntary mental images
are considered ‘intrusive’ by virtue of being unwanted and unbidden,
such is their ability to ‘hijack attention’ (Berntsen, 2001; Clark,
Holmes, & Mackay, in press).
The relationship between themaintenance of visualmental imagery
and the retention of information within visual short-term memory is
currently unclear, and the two processes may be related or even synon-
ymous with each other. According to Kosslyn et al., visual mental imag-
ery and visual short-term memory rely on a common ‘depictive
representation’ system, such that visual mental imagery is disrupted
by maintenance of perceptually similar items within visual short term
memory (Borst, Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2011). However, some ev-
idence suggests that the conscious experience of mental imagery and
short-term visuo-spatial retention can be dissociated from each other,
implying at least a partial dissociation between the cognitive processes
that underlie each function (Pearson, 2007; Zeman et al., 2010). In addi-
tion,while themajority of the research literature has tended to focus on
themaintenance of visualmental images, imagery in other sensorymo-
dalities also necessitates a maintenance process prior to any further
inspection or transformation processes being carried out (Zatorre,
Halpern, & Bouffard, 2010). This is because mental images usually
fade quickly once generated in order to avoid any disruption to normal
perception (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006).
Based on evidence that visual mental imagery and visual short-
term memory may rely upon a common ‘depictive representation’
system, administering tasks developed to test retention in visual
short-term memory may shed light on the capabilities of this system
for holding visual mental images. Similarly, since active maintenance
of visual mental images requires the central executive component of
visual working memory, ‘complex span’ tasks might be used to assess
an individual's capacity to effortfully maintain visual mental images.
3.3. Image inspection
Once generated and maintained, a mental image can be inspected
to provide a basis for further cognitive processing. The inspection
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property of a generated image. For example, a participant might be
asked to describe the shape formed by a fox's ear. Typically in re-
sponse to this type of question a person would generate a mental
image of a fox and then examine the shape of the ears within the
image in order to produce a response (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Within
the computational theory such image inspection processes involve
shifting an attention window across the mental image held within
the visual buffer to encode its geometric properties (Kosslyn, 1994;
Kosslyn et al., 2006). The attention window typically shifts across an
image in incremental stages, with the spatial relationships between
different parts of an image encoded by a subsystem dedicated to pro-
cessing spatial properties (Kosslyn, 1994). Studies based on examin-
ing regional cerebral blood ﬂow suggest that the processes that
contribute to image inspection are distinct from those for image gen-
eration, maintenance, and transformation (Kosslyn et al., 2004).
One of the most widely researched aspects of image inspection is
mental scanning during which the focus of attention in an image is
shifted from one point to another. A large number of studies suggest
that the time taken to incrementally scan across a mental image in-
creases linearly with the distance scanned (Denis & Kosslyn, 1999).
Early scanning paradigms involved giving participants explicit instruc-
tions to scan across a mental image, but these ﬁndings were criticised
as potentially reﬂecting participants' prior expectations of simulating
movement rather than underlying spatial properties of the image itself
(e.g., Baddeley, 1990; Denis & Carfantan, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1981). How-
ever, more recent scanning paradigms do not make any explicit refer-
ence to scanning across a mental image (e.g., Borst & Kosslyn, 2010;
Dror, Kosslyn, &Waag, 1993), making such a ‘tacit knowledge’ criticism
harder to apply to the experimental ﬁndings (Kosslyn et al., 2006). In-
spection processes can be applied both to imagery that derives from
perceptual experience and to images that are created from verbal de-
scriptions (Pearson et al., 2001). However, a PET study conducted by
Mellet et al. (2002) suggests there may be signiﬁcant differences in
scanning of images that derive either from verbal descriptions or direct-
ly from visual learning. Mental scanning has been demonstrated in
congenitally blind participants, although reported scanning times are
shorter in duration in comparison to sighted groups (Iachini &
Ruggiero, 2010).
3.4. Image transformation and manipulation
The active manipulation and transformation of mental images
occurs during many different aspects of everyday problem-solving
and creative thinking (Pearson, 2007; Pearson et al., 2001). One of
the most extensively researched types of image transformation is
that of mental rotation, a paradigm ﬁrst established by Shepard and
Metzler (1971). The standard ﬁnding is that the further a participant
has to mentally rotate an image the longer it takes them to make a re-
sponse (Shepard & Cooper, 1982). Within the computational model of
imagery mental rotation occurs through an incremental modulation
of the mapping function between the object-properties-processing
subsystem and the visual buffer in which the image is represented
(Kosslyn et al., 2006).
Another form of transformation is image restructuring in which the
interpretation of a mental image is changed or modiﬁed in some way
(Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989; Verstijnen, Hennessy, van Leeuwen,
Hamel, & Goldschmidt, 1998). This type of transformation underlies
performance during component detection tasks (Reed & Johnson,
1975) or during the re-interpretation of ambiguous ﬁgures using
imagery alone (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Riquelme, 2002). These types
of transformations can be constrained by the contextual reference
frame within which an image is originally generated (Reisberg,
1996; Reisberg & Logie, 1993; Verstijnen, Hennessy et al., 1998;
Verstijnen, van Leeuwen, Goldschmidt, Hamel, & Hennessey, 1998),
and by verbal overshadowing effects which reﬂect the interferenceof visual memory as a result of verbally describing the same stimuli
(Brandimonte & Collina, 2008). Additional image transformations
can include changes in size (Kosslyn, 1975) and colour (Watkins &
Schiano, 1982).
A combination of mental rotation and image restructuring occurs
during mental synthesis, in which discrete parts of an image are
transformed and manipulated in order to produce novel patterns or
allow new insights (Pearson et al., 2001). Such synthesis has been
linked to cognitive activities such as design (Reed, 1993), scientiﬁc
reasoning (Gardner, 1953), and general problem-solving (Antonietti
& Baldo, 1994). Though less formally studied, this process clearly re-
lates to the clinical psychology technique of ‘imagery restructuring’
or ‘imagery re-scripting’ as used in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy
(Arntz, 2012; Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012; Holmes, Arntz et al., 2007).
Some research ﬁndings suggest that mental transformation of a
perceived object (such as mental rotation) can be dissociated from
transformations of larger environmental scenes (Hegarty & Waller,
2004; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001) and from visualizing spatial lo-
cations (Thompson, Slotnick, Burrage, & Kosslyn, 2009). Research also
shows that mental transformations can become impaired in condi-
tions such as hemispatial neglect (Palermo et al., 2010) and develop-
mental coordination disorder (Williams, Thomas, Maruff, & Wilson,
2008). While the majority of research ﬁndings on image transforma-
tion relate to visual mental imagery, there is evidence to support
transformations in other sensory modalities such as auditory imagery
(Zatorre et al., 2010) and haptic imagery (Miquee et al., 2008).
3.5. Subjective experience of mental imagery
The measures described in the previous sections focus on mental
imagery as internal representations that reproduce or simulate the
properties of perceptual representations (Pearson, 2007). However,
these measures do not address the phenomenological characteristics
of mental imagery, that is, how mental imagery is consciously experi-
enced. This aspect of imagery can be assessed using subjective mea-
sures in which participants rate or describe different characteristics
of their conscious experience of mental imagery. One common di-
mension assessed by subjective measures is the vividness of a mental
image, which can be used to refer both to luminosity and clarity of
mental imagery, as well as the extent to which an individual's subjec-
tive experience of imagery is similar to actual perceptual experience
(Pearson et al., 2001). The extent of mental imagery experienced in
everyday life has also been linked to individual differences in areas
such as memory and creative thinking (Pearson, 2007; Valenti,
Libby, & Eibach, 2011).
Baddeley and Andrade (1998) have argued that image vividness
reﬂects the storage of rich and detailed sensory-based representa-
tions held in the visual and auditory slave systems of working mem-
ory. This hypothesis is supported by the results of an fMRI study
conducted by Belardinelli et al. (2009) which found that vividness
of mental imagery in different modalities is related to higher activa-
tion in neural substrates associated with perception of the same mo-
dality. Modality-speciﬁc visual and auditory neural substrates have
also been linked to the subjective experience of mental imagery and
to the retrieval of sensory-bound information from autobiographical
memory (Huijbers, Pennartz, Rubin, & Daselaar, 2011). There is an
emerging literature on vividness as probed via neuroimaging studies
e.g. by Stokes and colleagues (Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, & Duncan,
2009) .
Consistent with these ﬁndings are behavioural studies that show
concurrent tasks placing a high load on working memory capacity can
disrupt the vividness of mental imagery for negative autobiographical
events (e.g., Andrade, Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997; Kavanagh, Freese,
Andrade, & May, 2001; van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001).
However, it remains a source of debate in the literature whether such
disruption reﬂects modality-speciﬁc interference or general working
8 D.G. Pearson et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 33 (2013) 1–23memory load. For example, in a recent study by van den Hout et al.
(2011), both EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing)
and attentional breathing exercises associated with Mindfulness-Based
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) were found to reduce vividness and emo-
tionality of negativememories. Van denHout et al. interpret this ﬁnding
in terms of task performance of EMDR and MBCT both equally taxing
the limited capacity of the working memory system. In contrast, other
studies have found concurrent visuo-spatial tasks are more effective at
reducing subjective vividness and emotionality than comparable verbal
tasks (e.g., Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell, & Holmes, 2009) or im-
pact differentially on later involuntary images (Holmes, James, Kilford,
& Deeprose, 2010).
A number of measures have been developed aiming to tap into in-
dividual differences in the subjective experience of mental imagery as
reviewed by Richardson (1994). Although the predominant focus has
typically been on the assessment of trait use of visual imagery, there
have also been attempts to assess imagery both in relation to speciﬁc
tasks and across sensory modalities (Section 5.5, and summarised in
Table 2).
4. Imagery in clinical psychology
Clinical studies investigating mental imagery have employed a di-
verse and sometimes eclectic range of measures. Although various fo-
cuses have been on involuntary imagery, or processes of imagery
thought to reﬂect an inherent processing bias (e.g., valence of imagery
content and perspective of imagery), it has typically been held that
the key facets of imagery are speciﬁc to the disorder under consider-
ation. We will now consider the assessment of imagery in clinical psy-
chology with speciﬁc reference to PTSD, social phobia, schizophrenia
and depression and ﬁnally, bipolar disorder. Although bipolar disorder
has received less attention to date in this ﬁeld, we have recently pro-
posed that imagery may play a particular role in inﬂuencing the key
characteristics of the disorder (Holmes, Geddes et al., 2008).
4.1. Post-traumatic stress disorder
PTSD may result from experiencing or viewing a traumatic event
involving death, serious injury, or threat to self or others (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Flashbacks (intrusive images) are the
hallmark symptom of this disorder (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael,
2004; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Roths, &
Clark, 2007) and consist of vivid and emotional memories for the
trauma, accompanied by a strong sense of current threat or “here
and now-ness” (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Current cognitive infor-
mation processing theories of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers &
Clark, 2000) converge on the idea that intrusive images develop due
to impaired information processing during the traumatic event
(Holmes & Bourne, 2008). As such, many studies have explored the
intrusive nature of this mental imagery in PTSD.
4.1.1. Imagery assessment in PTSD
Imagery in PTSD has largely been assessed using techniques such as
script-driven imagery procedures (Section 5.6.1), and intrusion diaries
and interviews (Sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5), in which the objective is to ex-
plore the content and frequency of image-based intrusions. There has
been comparatively little research focusing on investigating the disorder
from the perspective of cognitive behavioural imagerymeasures.We pro-
pose itwill be valuable to establishwhether PTSD groups display a similar
deﬁcit in image generation processes to that previously reported for social
phobia (Morrison, Amir, & Taylor, 2011, Section 4.2.1) and depression
(Cocude et al., 1997, Section 4.4.1; Zarrinpar et al., 2006). If present,
such a deﬁcit might reﬂect a bias towards generating trauma-related im-
agery that creates interference with image generation for neutral stimuli.
Some researchers have attributed the success of clinical treat-
ments of PTSD such as EMDR to modality-speciﬁc disruption of visualworking memory processes (e.g. Holmes et al., 2010; Lilley et al., 2009;
van den Hout et al., 2012). This can be related to the literature on image
maintenance and inspection processes described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3,
which have been argued to overlap with the processes involved during
rehearsal in visuo-spatial working memory (Borst et al., 2011; Logie,
1995; Pearson & Sawyer, 2011). In addition, imagery re-scripting tech-
niques used to treat PTSD in CBT (e.g. Holmes, Arntz et al., 2007) can be
understood in relation to image transformation and restructuring pro-
cesses (see Sections 3.4 and 5.4.4).
4.2. Social phobia
In social phobia, individuals fear situations such as public speaking,
interviews and meeting people they do not already know (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). The recurrent and distressing imagery
reported by individuals with social phobia is often that of a previously
experienced event (Hackmann et al., 2000) and such imagery is pro-
posed to contribute to themaintenance of the disorder in contemporary
cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The
observer perspective adopted within imagery is a feature of this disor-
der (Hackmann et al., 2000). Such imagery has been demonstrated to
have a causal impact on anxiety (Hirsch, Clark, Williams, Morrison, &
Mathews, 2005).
4.2.1. Imagery assessment in social phobia
Morrison et al. (2011) have explored performance of image gener-
ation in socially anxious and non-socially anxious participants (see
Section 5.1.1 for a description of the imagery procedure). They
found that socially anxious participants were impaired in their ability
to generate mental imagery for neutral stimuli (letters of the alpha-
bet) as compared to non-socially anxious participants. It has yet to
be established whether a similar generation deﬁcit can be found
with imagery for emotional material, or whether socially-anxious in-
dividuals may even display enhanced generation times for highly
self-relevant imagery such as self-image. This highlights the need to
explore underlying cognitive imagery processes in addition to the
phenomenology of the imagery associated with social phobia.
Hackmann et al. (2000) have used a semi-structured interview
(Section 5.5.8) to explore the frequency and nature of mental images
in social phobia. All participants reported recurrent negative images,
most of which were related to an adverse social event occurring
near to the time of onset of the disorder suggesting a relationship
with onset and maintenance of the disorder. The same interview
method has been employed by Lockett et al. (2012) in relation to
socially-anxious individuals with a comorbid diagnosis of psychosis.
They found that while some participants reported typical social anxi-
ety imagery others experienced more threatening imagery that may
be related to residual psychotic paranoia. Furthermore, while social
anxiety images were experienced typically from an observer perspec-
tive, imagery related to psychosis tended to be experienced more
from a ﬁeld perspective. We propose it will be valuable to explore
in future research whether these differences in the phenomenology
of imagery associated with comorbid conditions of social phobia and
psychosis are associated with signiﬁcant differences in cognitive pro-
cesses such as image inspection (Section 3.3) or image manipulation
(Section 3.4).
4.3. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is characterised by an array of symptoms: positive
symptoms include hallucinations, delusional beliefs, disorganised
speech and behaviour whereas negative symptoms include blunted
emotion and lack of motivation (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Mental imagery research in this ﬁeld has focused on the posi-
tive symptom of hallucinations and the relationship with trait imag-
ery, given the observation that hallucinatory imagery appears in the
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Mathews, 2010; Oertel et al., 2009). The second key theme in imagery
research has been the exploration of imagery of the past and for the
future given the proposed disturbance of the sense of self across
time in the disorder (Danion et al., 2005; D'Argembeau et al., 2008).
4.3.1. Imagery assessment in schizophrenia
The Questionnaire on Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967; Section 5.5.1)
has been used by Oertel et al. (2009) to investigate the relationship be-
tween the vividness of imagery and predisposition towards hallucinatory
experience in schizophrenia. Findings revealed greater vividness of imag-
ery in patients with schizophrenia and also in ﬁrst-degree relatives and
high-schizotypy controls when compared to low-schizotypy controls.
On this basis, the authors suggested that vividness of imagery may be
an independent symptom and trait marker for the schizophrenia
spectrum. However, Bell and Halligan (2010) report a study in which
the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Section 5.5.2.) was used
to explore the relationship between vividness of imagery and schizotypal
traits in an analogue non-clinical population. Interestingly, this study did
not replicate the ﬁndings of Oertel et al. (2009), in that no signiﬁcant
differences were found between high and low schizotypy groups on
imagery vividness as assessed using the VVIQ. Although explanation for
the conﬂicting ﬁndings may be attributed to differences in the samples
in each study, it is noteworthy that, as suggested by Bell and Halligan,
the VVIQ speciﬁcally measures visual imagery whereas the QMI looks at
imagery across seven sensory domains. Thus, demonstrations suggesting
that vividness of imagery is a trait marker for schizotypymay only be ob-
served when imagery is assessed across several domains.
Considering the reported differences in phenomenology of imag-
ery associated with high and low schizotypy we argue this clinical
group will be valuable to examine in terms of cognitive imagery pro-
cesses such as image maintenance (Section 3.2) and image inspection
(Section 3.3). Aleman, de Haan, and Kahn (2005) have reported that
people with schizophrenia are impaired on a measure of image in-
spection (see Section 5.3.9), but not image generation (Section
5.1.1). This may reﬂect deﬁciency in the voluntary control of imagery,
or over-taxing of imagery processes caused by persistent hallucinato-
ry or delusional states. There is also evidence that schizophrenia is re-
lated to problems in maintaining and controlling visual information
in working memory (Kang, Sponheim, Chafee, & MacDonald, 2011),
as well as deﬁcits in spatial working memory maintenance (Lee,
Folley, Gore, & Park, 2008).
Assessment of mental imagery in schizophrenia must also take
into account the presence of generalised cognitive deﬁcits, in particu-
lar slowness of information processing and executive dysfunction
(Rajji, Ismail, & Mulsant, 2009). Such general deﬁcits could produce
impairment across multiple imagery measures, in particular when
considering that executive resources may play a central role in imag-
ery experience (Logie & Salway, 1990; Pearson et al., 1996; Pearson et
al., 1999; Salway & Logie, 1995). However, the studies reported by
Aleman et al. (2005), Kang et al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2008) de-
scribed above indicate that investigation of speciﬁc imagery-based
deﬁcits in schizophrenia can be valuable and informative.
4.4. Depression
Depression is associated with a range of cognitive (e.g., concentra-
tion difﬁculties), emotional (e.g., feelings of extreme sadness and hope-
less), and behavioural (e.g., sleep disruption) symptoms (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Traditionally, depression has been asso-
ciated with verbal, rather than imagery based processes, such as nega-
tive rumination (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002).
However, a role for imagery has more recently become of concern,
with up to 90% of depressed patients reporting distressing intrusive
memories of past experiences (Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007), see
also Reynolds and Brewin (1998). Furthermore, negative, maladaptiveappraisals of intrusive memories, (e.g., ‘having this memory means
that I am weak’) have been proposed to maintain the occurrence of in-
trusive memories, and in turn, depressive symptoms (Starr & Moulds,
2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008). Thus studies in depression have typi-
cally investigated negative imagery of the past. More recently there has
been interest in a lack of positive imagery for the future (Holmes, Lang,
Moulds, & Steele, 2008;Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, &Holmes,
2011;Werner-Seidler &Moulds, 2010) and image-based interpretation
biases (Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009).
4.4.1. Imagery assessment in depression
The Image Duration Task (seeSection 5.2.6) has been used to compare
the latency and duration of images in depressed participants compared to
healthy volunteers (Cocude et al., 1997). Although the depressed partici-
pants found it more difﬁcult to generate images (e.g. 2.61 seconds for
mean high-imagery noun generation time in the control group, compared
to 4.43 seconds in the participants with depression), the two groups did
not differ in the duration of images generated. This suggests impairment
in image generation processes rather than imagemaintenance. Themen-
tal rotation of letters (see Section 5.4.1.1.) has also been shown to be im-
paired in unipolar major depression (Rogers et al., 2002), which may be
indicative of a more general deﬁcit in image transformation processes
(Section 3.4).
For associated phenomenology the mental imagery interview
(Section 5.5.8) has been used to explore the frequency and nature of sui-
cidal imagery in depression. Results showed that all participants experi-
enced intrusive, recurrent suicide-related images when at their most
despairing, which the authors termed “ﬂash-forwards” to suicide (repli-
cated by Crane, Shah, Barnhofer, & Holmes, 2012; Hales, Deeprose,
Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011). However, using the Future Cueing Task
(Section 5.7.2), Williams et al. (1996) found that suicidal depressed par-
ticipants demonstrated impairment in generating images of the future
for all sets of cues (positive, negative and neutral) compared tomatched
controls. This degree of impairment was found to correlate with the ex-
tent to which participants had difﬁculty in retrieving speciﬁc autobio-
graphical memories.
As with schizophrenia (Section 4.3), assessment of imagery in pa-
tients suffering from depression should also take into account the pres-
ence of generalised cognitive deﬁcits (Castaneda, Tuulio-Henricksson,
Marttunen, Suvisaari, & Lönnqvist, 2008).
4.5. Bipolar disorder
Bipolar disorder is deﬁned by manic episodes interspersed with
episodes of depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). As
many as 90% of bipolar patients experience a comorbid anxiety disor-
der at some stage (Merikangas et al., 2007) and the disorder presents
a major cause of mortality due to the prevalence of suicide (Balazs et
al., 2006; Hawton, Sutton, Haw, Sinclair, & Harriss, 2005). A recent
cognitive model by Holmes, Geddes et al. (2008) suggests that bipolar
disorder may be associated with particularly high imagery-proneness
and proposes that imagery may play a role in modulating the mood
swings which characterise the disorder. The model suggests that pro-
spective imagery may be of particular interest in bipolar disorder, and
may contribute towards not only depressive episodes but mania as
well.
4.5.1. Imagery assessment in bipolar disorder
In bipolar disorder, signiﬁcantly higher Spontaneous Use of Imagery
Scale (see Section 5.5.3) scores have been observed compared to
healthy volunteers (Holmes et al., 2011) and unipolar depressed partic-
ipants (Hales et al., 2011), indicating higher general use of imagery in
bipolar patients. Patients with bipolar disorder have also shown signif-
icantly higher ratings on the imagery processing item of the Verbal and
Imagery-based Thoughts Visual Analogue Scale (see Section 5.5.7) com-
pared to healthy volunteers and in contrast, signiﬁcantly lower ratings
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ings have been reported by McCarthy-Jones, Knowles, and Rowse
(2012) using a bespoke scale of imagery use.
The Mental Imagery Interview (Section 5.5.8) has been used to in-
vestigate imagery relating to suicidal cognitions in both bipolar and
unipolar patients (Hales et al., 2011). All participants reported imag-
ery relating to suicide, thus replicating previous ﬁndings in unipolar
depression (Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007) and extending
these to bipolar disorder. There were no differences between the bi-
polar and unipolar group in terms of verbal cognitions related to sui-
cide. However, the bipolar group rated their suicidal imagery as
signiﬁcantly more compelling, reported a signiﬁcantly greater preoc-
cupation with the suicidal imagery and ﬁnally, were more than twice
as likely to report that the images made them want to take action to
complete suicide than the unipolar group.
In terms of cognitive imagery processes recent ﬁndings from Pan,
Hsieh, and Liu (2011) suggest that remitted bipolar patients show
deﬁcits in visuospatial working memory under high working memory
load conditions. There is thus a need to further explore bipolar disor-
der in relation to the experimental measures of imagery performance
(see also Thompson et al., 2005). As in depression and schizophrenia,
general cognitive deﬁcits should also be taken into account when
assessing mental imagery in bipolar patients (Bearden, Hoffman, &
Cannon, 2001).
5. A critical review of mental imagery measures in clinical and
experimental psychology
This section reviews experimental and clinical measures for
assessing mental imagery reported in the literature. The basis for
the literature search and criteria for task selection are outlined in
Section 2. Table 1 summarises the measures for assessing the cogni-
tive stages of imagery as outlined in Section 3. Table 2 summarises
measures for assessing general imagery use and experience. Finally,
Table 3 summarises measures that have speciﬁc focus on imagery
use in relation to clinical disorders. The original references for tasks
are identiﬁed along with published variants. The format of tasks
(computer-based or pen-and-paper) is also noted.
5.1. Experimental tasks for image generation
5.1.1. Image generation task
Podgorny and Shepard (1978) devised an image generation proce-
dure in which participants are required to imagine a pattern of shad-
ed blocks projected onto a blank 5×5 matrix (either following visual
presentation of the pattern or following a series of verbal instruc-
tions). On each experimental trial a circular probe dot appears in a
cell of the matrix and participants are asked to indicate as quickly
as possible whether the probe falls within the mental image or out-
side it. Podgorny and Shepard found that the recorded response
times on this task did not differ depending on whether the pattern
was imagined, remembered, or actually perceived.
A variant of this procedurewas developed byKosslyn and colleagues
(Dror & Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, & Von Gierke, 1988). On
each trial, participants are presented with a blank 4×5 matrix and a
lowercase letter. Probe items then appear in separate cells of thematrix
and participants have to indicate as quickly as possible whether the
probes fall within a mental image of the uppercase version of letter
within the matrix. The pattern of response times using this variant
task indicated that imagery for the letters was generated sequentially
rather than simultaneously, with complex letters containing more
segments requiring longer to imagine than simpler forms. Using this
variant Morrison et al. (2011) have shown that socially anxious partic-
ipants are impaired in their ability to generate imagery for neutral
stimuli as compared to non-socially anxious participants (see also
Section 4.2.1). This variant has also been used with participantssuffering from schizophrenia (Aleman et al., 2005) who show normal
performance in comparison to healthy controls, although theywere sig-
niﬁcantly impaired on a further measure of image inspection (see
Section 5.3.9).
5.1.2. Mental clocks task
Paivio (1978) reports a task in which participants are verbally
presented with pairs of times (i.e., six o'clock and half past ﬁve) and
asked to indicate which time would produce the smallest angle be-
tween the hands if the time was represented by an analogue clock.
Response times indicated that participants took longer to make the
decision as the angular difference between the two times grew small-
er. A variant of the task termed the “O'Clock Test” requires partici-
pants to choose the larger rather than smaller angle formed by the
hour and minute hands (Grossi, Modafferi, Pelosi, & Trojano, 1989).
Again, this task necessitates the generation of mental imagery to pro-
vide the correct answer.
5.1.3. Familiar squares description test
A procedure devised by Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978) requires par-
ticipants to describe a familiar city square from two opposing points
of view (for example, the view when standing from the east and
then from the west). Performance is scored as the total number of el-
ements from the scene accurately described. Variants of this proce-
dure include describing an imagined map of a country instead of a
square (Bartolomeo, D'Erme, & Gainotti, 1994; Rode et al., 2010).
5.1.4. The buildings task
In a task described by Nori and Giusberti (2006) participants are
presented with a photograph of a building for 3 s and asked to create
a mental image of it. Using this image they are then asked to identify
the original picture from three similar distracters. A variant used by
Palermo et al. (2010) increases the initial study time from three to
ten seconds.
See also the Image Duration Task used by Cocude and Denis (1986,
1988) described below for an additional example of an image gener-
ation procedure.
5.1.5. Evaluation of image generation measures
The Image Generation (Section 5.1.1) and Mental Clocks (Section
5.1.2) tasks are computerised measures, while the Familiar Squares
(Section 5.1.3) and Buildings (Section 5.1.4) tasks can be implemented
without access to a computer. Non-computerised methods may confer
the advantage of being easy to administer across a range of different as-
sessment circumstances in clinical settings, andmight also be more ap-
propriate for assessing individuals who experience difﬁculty or are
uncomfortable in completing computer-based assessments. However,
computerised methods provide higher levels of accuracy in recording
behavioural data, including registering image generation times in
milliseconds. This greater sensitivity may allow for detection of individ-
ual differences that would be more difﬁcult to establish using non-
computerised methods alone.
For example, the Image Generation Task (Section 5.1.1) can only be
implemented using computerised assessment, and has proved very ef-
fective in establishing image generation deﬁcits in clinical groups suf-
fering from social anxiety (Morrison et al., 2011), as well as groups
with congenital/prelingual deafness (Emmorey & Kosslyn, 1996). How-
ever, this measure only assesses the generation of neutral stimuli, and
therefore may fail to detect image generation effects that are speciﬁc
to emotional material, or highly self-relevant imagery (see discussion
in 5.2.1.). For assessing this class of imagery a variant of the Image Du-
ration task described below (see Section 5.2.6) may be more effective,
as images are generated in response to concrete nouns rather than neu-
tral stimuli.
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5.2.1. Image Maintenance task
This task initially devised by Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf,
and Daly (1990) requires participants to memorise a pattern presented
within a matrix (e.g., 4×5). In the variant reported by Dror and Kosslyn
(1994), once a mental image is formed the pattern disappears and after
a retention interval of 2500 ms inwhich participants are asked to retain
the image of the pattern, probe items are presented in separate cells of
the blankmatrix. Aswith the image generation task described previous-
ly, participants have to indicate as quickly as possible whether the
probe falls within the mental image of the pattern or not. Dror and
Kosslyn (1994) reported that both error rates and response times on
the task increased as the complexity of the pattern to bemaintained be-
comes greater. This demonstrates that the amount of information rep-
resented in a mental image places proportionally greater load on the
image maintenance process.
5.2.2. Visual Patterns Test
This is a widely-used measure of maintenance in visuo-spatial
memory developed by Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, Allamano, and
Wilson (1999), Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, and Wilson (1997). On
each trial participants are presented with a matrix in which half the
cells have been ﬁlled. After viewing the pattern for three seconds par-
ticipants are asked to reproduce it accurately using a blank matrix.
Three different patterns are presented at each level of complexity, be-
ginning with a simple 2×2 matrix and leading up to a 5×6 matrix
that comprises ﬁfteen ﬁlled cells. Performance is scored as being the
number of cells in the largest matrix that a participant can accurately
recall. Performance on the task has been linked to the maintenance of
visual mental imagery (Kemps & Andrade, 2012).
5.2.3. Change detection tasks
Computerised change detection tasks are used to estimate the ca-
pacity of visual short-termmemory (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Participants
judge whether a test array of visual items (e.g. coloured squares) dif-
fers (‘change’) or does not differ (‘no change’) from a comparison
array presented following a brief retention period. Test and compari-
son arrays are either identical or differing by a feature of one item
(e.g. colour, location). Proportion correct judgments, sensitivity (d′)
and estimates of the maximum number of complete items encoded
(e.g. Cowan's K) are then calculated.
5.2.4. Visual short-term memory precision
A procedure developed by Bays and Husain (2008) examines the
precision of visual short-term memory. In precision paradigms, par-
ticipants typically view an array of items, e.g. several bars that differ
in colour and orientation. Following a short delay, participants repro-
duce a given feature of one of the items (e.g. orientation) using the
method of adjustment. Precision is calculated as the reciprocal of
the standard deviation of error in response. Interestingly, precision
depends on the total number of items presented (Bays, Catalao, &
Husain, 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008). This suggests that visual
short-term memory relies upon a limited, dynamic resource that is
ﬂexibly distributed among stored items. If more items are encoded
in an image, their ‘grain’ or resolution should decline.
5.2.5. Complex span tasks
In the developmental literature, complex span tasks are used to
measure active maintenance by the central executive component of
working memory (Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006). For exam-
ple, in the odd-one-out task (Russell, Jarrold, & Henry, 1996), partic-
ipants view three shapes in a single row of a matrix (e.g. 4 x 3), and
are asked to identify the odd-one-out. This is repeated until all rows
have been probed. At the end of the trial, the participant recalls the
location of each odd-one-out shape in order by pointing sequentiallyto the correct cell in each row on the matrix. While it is clear that such
tasks rely upon active executive maintenance, they do not control for
the extent to which this maintenance acts upon visual, verbal or some
other form of representations (e.g. kinaesthetic).
5.2.6. Image duration tasks
Cocude and Denis (1986, 1988) report studies in which the image
duration task requires participants to generate mental images in
response to a series of concrete nouns and then indicate at what
point their experience of the images ceases. While high-imagery
words were found to be related to faster generation times in compar-
ison to low-imagery words there were no reported differences in
image maintenance times between the two classes of words. This
task has been used to compare latency and duration of imagery in de-
pressed participants compared to healthy controls (Cocude et al.,
1997; see Section 5.4.1).
5.2.7. Evaluation of image maintenance measures
All of the described measures are best implemented in the form of
computer-based assessment, although the Visual Patterns test (Section
5.2.2) can be presented in a paper-and-pencil based format (see Della
Sala et al., 1997; Della Sala et al., 1999). As with image generation
(Section 5.1.5) computer-based tasks may provide greater sensitivity by
allowing for greater accuracy inmeasuring the duration of imagemainte-
nance. The Image Duration task (Section 5.2.6) combines measures of
both image latency and duration, and has been used to study imagery
processes in depression (Cocude et al., 1997). Because imagery is
generated and maintained in response to concrete nouns, the Image Du-
ration paradigm affords scope to manipulate the emotionality and
self-relevance of stimuli by manipulating the nature of the presented
cue words.
Only the Image Maintenance (Section 5.2.1) and Image Duration
(Section 5.2.6) tasks explicitly require participants to maintain a con-
scious mental image. The other tasks assess maintenance processes
within visual short-term memory, and therefore should be considered
indirect measures of image maintenance. A number of recent studies
have demonstrated that performance of visual short-term memory
tasks involves mental imagery (Borst, Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn,
2012; Borst, Niven, & Logie, 2012; Hamame et al., 2012; Kemps &
Andrade, 2012). When considering the growing evidence that mainte-
nance processes in mental imagery and visual short-term memory
share a common substrate (see Section 3.2) deﬁcits on these tasks can
be seen as indicative of potential image maintenance problems.
5.3. Experimental tasks for image inspection
5.3.1. Image scanning tasks
Finke and Pinker (1983) reported a procedure in which participants
are presented with a pattern of between three and ﬁve randomly po-
sitioned dots for 4 s. Following a 2 s retention interval, participants
are asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether a displayed
arrow is pointing to the previous location of one of the dots or not.
Recorded latencies revealed a linear relationship between response
time and distance between arrow and dot, such that the greater the
distance, the longer it took participants to scan their mental image.
A variant devised by Dror et al. (1993) presents a square ring of six
cells each side within which three cells are randomly darkened on
each trial. Following presentation of an arrow participants indicate
as quickly as possible whether it points to a previously ﬁlled cell or
not. A further variant of the Finke and Pinker paradigm has also
been published by Borst and Kosslyn (2010).
5.3.2. Map scanning tasks
In the original study reported by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978),
this task requires that participants memorise a map containing seven
locations at different distances from each other. Following this, on
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and are instructed to imagine a small dot moving from that location
to another named location. Latencies revealed a linear relationship
between response time and spatial distance between locations; the
further the distance, the longer the response time. In a variant de-
vised by Mellet et al. (2002), participants are asked to form mental
images of a park or village environment that is learnt either from ver-
bal descriptions or a visually-presented map. On each trial they are
presented with the names of two landmarks (e.g., church, school)
and asked to imagine scanning from the ﬁrst location to the second.
5.3.3. Letter corner classiﬁcation task
This was originally described by Brooks (1968), with variants
reported by Baddeley, Grant, Wight, and Thompson (1975) and
Farah et al. (1988). On each trial an uppercase letter is presented to
participants with one corner marked with an asterisk. Participants
are asked to imagine the letter and travel clockwise from the marked
corner indicating whether they are on the top or bottom of the ﬁgure
(“yes”) or neither (“no”). The letters F, G, M, N, W, and Z are typically
presented.
5.3.4. Mental size comparisons
This taskwas originally reported byMoyer (1973)who asked partic-
ipants to decide which of two animals would generally be larger (e.g., a
hamster or amouse), and found that response timeswere systematical-
ly longer if the animalswere of a similar size, compared towhen the dif-
ferences in size would be larger (e.g., a dog and an elephant). This was
interpreted as reﬂecting the use of mental imagery to establish the rel-
ative size of compared items. A variant was reported by Paivio (1975)
that involved size comparisons for both animals and objects (e.g., a
table and a bed). Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer, and Feinstein (1977)
have argued thatmental imagery is only utilised duringmental compar-
isonswhen relative size information is not explicitly available in seman-
tic memory; e.g., comparing a tiger and a leopard is more likely to
require imagery than comparing an elephant and a ﬂy. A study by
Konkle and Olivia has shown that real-world objects are drawn, imag-
ined and preferentially viewed at a consistent visual size (Konkle &
Oliva, 2011). There is no standardised list of items for mental size com-
parisons, but suitable stimuli are described in Paivio (1975), as well as
Policardi et al. (1996).
5.3.5. Animal tails test
This task has been described by Farah, Hammond, Mehta, and
Ratcliff (1989), Behrmann, Moscovitch, and Winocur (1994), and
Policardi et al. (1996). Participants are presented with the names of
animals (e.g., kangaroo, pig, elephant) and have to indicate whether
they have a long tail proportional to their body size. There is no
standardised list of animals used, although animals whose tail is a dis-
tinct feature (e.g., beaver, peacock) are avoided. Performance is
scored as the number of trials correctly identiﬁed.
5.3.6. Straight/curved letter task
In the original task reported by Coltheart, Hull, and Slater (1975)
participants are required to imagine the letters of the alphabet se-
quentially from A to Z in uppercase. External aids such as speaking
aloud and writing are not permitted and the task for the participant
is to count the number of letters containing a curve. Participants are
asked to perform the task as quickly as possible. The outcome mea-
sures are time taken to complete the task and the accuracy (correct
response versus incorrect response). In a variation reported by
Policardi et al. (1996) and later by Bridge, Harrold, Holmes, Stokes,
and Kennard (2012), participants are read aloud 20 letters in random
order, asked to imagine the presented letter in uppercase, and then to
indicate whether the letter contains curves or not. The outcome mea-
sure in this variation is the total number of correct responses.5.3.7. Mental hue comparison task
De Vreese (1991; Expt. 3) reports a task in which participants are
verbally provided with pairs of colour-speciﬁc objects (e.g., “ripe
tomato–ripe apricot; blood–poppy ﬁeld”) by the experimenter. The
task of the participant is to state whether or not they are chromatical-
ly similar and the outcome is the number of correct responses.
5.3.8. Top/Bottom larger letter task
Policardi et al. (1996) report a task in which uppercase letters
which are larger at either the top or at the bottom (e.g., F, L, V) are
read aloud by the experimenter in random order. The participant is
required to imagine each letter in upper-case form and then to classi-
fy it as being top-larger or bottom-larger. The outcome is the number
of correct responses.
5.3.9. Objects form task
This task was ﬁrst reported by Mehta, Newcombe, and Dehaan
(1992). Participants are presented with the names of three objects
(e.g., “pumpkin, lettuce, tomato”) and are asked to indicate the
odd-one-out based on inspecting the imagined form of the objects
(e.g., “lettuce” in the previous example). Aleman et al. (2005) have
reported that people with schizophrenia are impaired on this task
in comparison to healthy controls. Blind participants have also been
shown to make more errors on the objects form task in comparison
to sighted controls (Noordzij, Zuidhoek, & Postma, 2007).
5.3.10. Evaluation of image inspection measures
Mental comparison tasks such as relative size (Section 5.3.4), tail
length (Section 5.3.5), and colour hue (Section 5.3.7) have been widely
used to assess imagery in the literature. They have the advantage of
being easy to administer and score, and do not require access to a com-
puter. However, there can be ambiguity in establishing whether task
performance is based on inspecting mental imagery or instead abstract
semantic knowledge of the items being compared (Holyoak, 1977).
Tasks based on mentally inspecting imagery for letters of the alphabet
(Sections 5.3.3, 5.3.6, and 5.3.8) may therefore provide more reliable
data. The Objects Form task (Section 5.3.9) is also straight-forward to
administer and has been linked to evidence of signiﬁcant impairment
in schizophrenia (Aleman et al., 2005) and cases of late-onset blindness
(Noordzij et al., 2007).
Map scanning (Section 5.3.2) and image scanning (Section 5.3.1) are
computer-based paradigms that may confer greater sensitivity by re-
cording both response time and accuracy scores for participants'
imagery-based judgments. Image scanning could be considered prefer-
able to map scanning as it is less prone to accusations that judgments
reﬂect tacit knowledge rather underlying properties of mental imagery
(see discussion in Section 3.3). Mental scanning tasks have revealed
signiﬁcant deﬁcits in image inspection related to aging (Brown,
Kosslyn, & Dror, 1998) and blindness (Iachini & Ruggiero, 2010). A
variant of image scanning based on body width has successfully
been applied to evaluate visual disturbances in body image associat-
ed with anorexia nervosa (Smeets, Klugkist, van Rooden, Anema, &
Postma, 2009).
5.4. Experimental tasks for image transformation and manipulation
5.4.1. Mental rotation
5.4.1.1. Classic image rotation tasks. First devised by Shepard and
Metzler (1971), these tasks require participants to view pairs of
three-dimensional abstract shapes. Participants are then asked to decide
whether the pairs are identical or different. Response time has been
found to increase with the degree of angular rotation between the two
shapes; the further the shapes are rotated from their original position,
the longer it takes participants to judge whether the pairs are the same
or different. Variants have included rotation of two-dimensional shapes
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matrix patterns (Dror & Kosslyn, 1994). A computerised version of the
Shepard and Metzler (1971) task was used by Wright, Thompson,
Ganis, Newcombe, and Kosslyn (2008). The Cooper and Shepard
(1973) task has been used to demonstrate impairment in mental rota-
tion in unipolar depression (Rogers et al., 2002).
5.4.1.2. Manikin test. In this task devised by Ratcliff (1979), participants
view a series of drawings of a manikin presented in different rotated
positions and are asked to decide as quickly as possible whether a
black disk is held in the right or left hand. Thirty-two trials are
presented using orientations of forwards-upright, backwards-upright,
forwards-inverted, and backwards-inverted. In half the stimuli the
black disk is in the right hand and in the other half the left. Perfor-
mance is quantiﬁed as the total number of trials correctly completed.
5.4.1.3. Rotation-arrow task. Devised by Shah and Miyake (1996) this
task combines mental rotation with short-term memory for the ori-
entation of a sequence of arrows. On each trial participants are
presented with a rotated letter (from F, J, L, P, and R) which they clas-
sify as normal or a mirror-image, followed by an arrow pointing in a
random orientation. On each trial a set size of between two to ﬁve let-
ters can be presented, with performance based on correct recall of the
orientation of the sequence of arrows.
5.4.2. Image restructuring and reinterpretation
5.4.2.1. Component detection task. A procedure ﬁrst reported by Reed
and Johnson (1975) in which participants are asked to detect the pres-
ence of shapes within patterns that are either visually perceived or
imagined. A variant devised by Verstijnen, Hennessy et al. (1998),
Verstijnen, van Leeuwen et al. (1998) manipulates whether the shapes
required to be detected within the patterns are existing or novel com-
ponent parts.
5.4.2.2. Interpretation of ambiguous ﬁgures. Chambers and Reisberg
(1985) report a paradigm in which participants are required to form
a mental image of the ambiguous duck/rabbit ﬁgure based on a
brief visual presentation of ﬁve seconds. Participants are then asked
to reinterpret the ﬁgure based on either mental imagery alone or a
sketch drawn frommemory. Findings showed that the mental images
had been interpreted and were not held ‘ambiguously’. A later variant
of this procedure requires participants to mentally rotate a pattern
into a position where it can be reinterpreted as a meaningful shape
(Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Reisberg & Chambers, 1991).
5.4.2.3. Image combination and subtraction. Two related imagery rein-
terpretation procedures have been developed by Brandimonte, Hitch,
and Bishop (1992a,b,c). In the image combination task participants are
sequentially presented with two line drawings which if mentally
combined together form a recognisable object (e.g., a skipping rope,
a butterﬂy, a car, etc.). In the image subtraction task the procedure is
similar, but in this case the second line drawing must be mentally re-
moved from the ﬁrst in order to form a recognisable object. A full list
of the stimuli used is reproduced in Brandimonte et al. (1992c).
5.4.3. Mental synthesis
5.4.3.1. Image combination. Finke et al. (1989) report a procedure in
which participants are required to mentally manipulate alpha-numeric
symbols in response to a series of verbal instructions. For example,
“Imagine a capital ‘D’. Rotate the Fig. 90° to the left. Now place a capital
letter ‘J’ at the bottom. Identify the ﬁnal ﬁgure (answer: an umbrella)”. A
variant of the procedure is described by Behrmann et al. (1994) in
which participants follow verbal instructions in order to transform one
letter of the alphabet into another (e.g., “Take the letter ‘V’, turn it upsidedown. Put a horizontal line through the middle of it” (answer: the letter
‘A’).
5.4.3.2. Creative synthesis. In this procedure devised by Finke and
Slayton (1988), participants are verbally presented a series of trials
consisting of three alpha-numeric or geometric shapes (e.g., circle,
capital ‘D’, number ‘8’). The task requirement is to mentally combine
the stimuli into a recognisable object or scene (e.g., a smiling face).
The size, position, and orientation of the items can be transformed
in any way, although the ﬁnal design must only include the shapes
which were originally speciﬁed. Successful trials are verbally labelled
and then recorded on a sheet of paper. Variants of the procedure are
described by Anderson and Helstrup (1993), Helstrup and Anderson
(1996), and Pearson et al. (1999).
5.4.3.3. Temporal image integration task. This image integration task
was devised by Brockmole, Wang, and Irwin (2002) from a visual
memory task ﬁrst presented by Di Lollo (1980). On each trial partici-
pants are sequentially presented with two dot arrays enclosed within
4×4 grids. If both arrays are considered together all cells within the
grid would be ﬁlled by dots except one. Participants are asked to
mentally integrate a visual image of the ﬁrst array with the perceived
second array and then indicate as quickly as possible which cell
would remain unﬁlled. In a variant of the task reported by Lewis,
Borst, and Kosslyn (2011) participants are asked to generate the
image of the ﬁrst array either from short-term or long-term memory.
5.4.4. Evaluation of image transformation and manipulation measures
These measures incorporate aspects of image generation, mainte-
nance, and inspection processes. The greater task complexity in compar-
ison to the measures described previously (in Sections 5.1 to 5.3) may
mean interpretation of any observed deﬁcits or enhancements in perfor-
mance are more difﬁcult. However, we propose that evaluation of these
processes can be important because image transformation andmanipula-
tion underlie clinical techniques such as “imagery restructuring” or
“imagery re-scripting”; for example as used in Cognitive Behaviour
Therapy (e.g. Holmes, Arntz et al., 2007) or schema focussed therapy
(e.g. Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006) and so forth.
Mental rotation tasks (Section 5.4.1) are the most straight-forward
to administer, and can be implemented in both computerised and
paper-and-pencil variants (with performance in the latter based on
the number of items successfully completedwithin a set interval).Men-
tal rotation processes have been linked to imagined perspective trans-
formations, in which an image is viewed from either an observer
(third-person) or ﬁeld (ﬁrst-person) perspective (Gardner, Sorhus,
Edmonds, & Potts, 2012). Libby, Valenti, Pfent, and Eibach (2011) have
shown that imagining failure from an observer rather than ﬁeld per-
spective is associated with increased feelings of shame and negativity
of accessible knowledge amongst low self-esteem individuals. Mental
rotation deﬁcits have been identiﬁed in disorders including unipolar
depression (Rogers et al., 2002), schizophrenia (Quee, Eling, van der
Heijden, & Hildebrandt, 2011), and Williams Syndrome (Stinton,
Farran, & Courbois, 2008). Bulimia nervosa patients have also been
found to be impaired on mental transformations of their own body,
but not on transformations of external objects (Urgesi et al., 2011). Ob-
server perspective is also associated with poor outcomes in PTSD
(McIsaac & Eich, 2004) and depression (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009).
Restructuring and synthesis measures (Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3) can
provide further means to assess an individual's ability to both manipu-
late and reinterpret mental imagery. Deﬁcits in these areas may impact
negatively on the effectiveness of clinical techniques that are based on
imagemanipulation and reinterpretation, and this remains to be further
examined. For example, Holmes et al. have argued that imagining pos-
itive events from a ﬁeld perspective may be critical for improving posi-
tive emotion (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008). Patients who do
display signiﬁcant deﬁcits in image manipulation and reinterpretation
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ment to rely on mental visualization (for discussion of cognitive bene-
ﬁts of external support see Barquero & Logie, 1999; Verstijnen, van
Leeuwen et al., 1998).
5.5. Measures of general imagery use and experience
5.5.1. Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery
The original 150-item questionnaire investigates the ability to
image across seven sensory modalities (visual, auditory, cutaneous,
kinaesthetic, gustatory, olfactory and organic) (Betts, 1909). In the vi-
sual modality, for example, participants are asked to think of seeing
‘the sun sinking below the horizon’, and provide a rating for vividness
on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 ‘perfectly clear and vivid’ to 7 ‘no
image present at all’. The ‘organic’ modality corresponds to somatic
sensations such as hunger and thirst. Although comprehensive, this
measure is often considered prohibitively long, and thus, a shortened
form has been developed consisting of a subset of 35 items from the
original questionnaire (ﬁve items from each sensory modality)
(Sheehan, 1967). The validity of the shortened form of the question-
naire (also known as the Questionnaire on Mental imagery; QMI) is
supported by a high correlation (r=.92) with the original scale
(Sheehan, 1967).
The QMI has been used by Oertel et al. (2009) to investigate the
relationship between the vividness of imagery and predisposition to-
wards hallucinatory experience in schizophrenia (see Section 5.3).
5.5.2. Vividness of mental imagery (VVIQ)
Vividness of mental imagery can be assessed using this battery of 16
questions (Marks, 1973). Participants are asked to generate fourmental
images in turn (e.g., ‘Visualise the rising sun. Consider carefully the pic-
ture that comes before your mind's eye’). For each image, participants
respond to four items relating to that image (e.g., ‘The sky clears and
surrounds the sun with blueness’) by providing a rating on a scale
from 1 ‘perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision’ to 5 ‘no image at
all, you only “know” that you are thinking of an object’. Interestingly,
performance on this subjective measure of vividness has been shown
to correlate with objective measures of early visual cortex activity as
assessed using fMRI as well as performance on a psychophysiological
colour-naming task (Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, & Eagleman, 2007).
The VVIQ has also been used to explore the relationship between
vividness of imagery and schizotypal traits in an analogue non-clinical
population (Bell & Halligan, 2010; see Section 4.3).
5.5.3. Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS)
This measure of tendency towards general imagery use was devel-
oped by Kosslyn and colleagues (Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). It
consists of 12 items, such as ‘When I ﬁrst hear a friend's voice, a visual
image of him or her almost always comes to mind’. Participants are
asked to read the 12 items and to ‘indicate the degree towhich each is ap-
propriate for them’ using a 5-point scale (with 5 indicating ‘completely
appropriate’ and 1 indicating ‘never appropriate’). Reisberg et al. (2003)
reported good internal consistency for SUIS and a clear relationship be-
tween SUIS and VVIQ, with a small but reliable difference for SUIS score
between low-imagers and high-imagers, suggesting that the two mea-
sures assess a related construct.
In bipolar disorder, signiﬁcantly higher SUIS scores have been ob-
served compared to healthy volunteers (Holmes et al., 2011) and uni-
polar depressed participants (Hales et al., 2011), consistent with the
clinical hypothesis that people with bipolar disorder have an en-
hanced propensity to engage in mental imagery; see Section 4.5.
5.5.4. Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS)
Absorption is deﬁned as ‘openness to absorbing and self-altering ex-
periences’ (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). This 34-item scale forms part of
the largerMultidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen, 1982)and assesses predisposition to become highly involved in imaginative
or sensory everyday experiences. Items such as ‘If I wish, I can imagine
(or daydream) some things so vividly that they holdmy attention in the
way a good movie or story does’ are rated as ‘true’ or ‘false’ by the par-
ticipant. Tellegen (1982) reports high levels of internal consistency (r=
.88) and test–retest reliability (r=.91) for this measure in non-clinical
samples.
5.5.5. Verbaliser–Visualiser Questionnaire (VVQ)
The VVQ (Richardson, 1977) consists of 15 items taken from Paivio's
Ways of Thinking Questionnaire (Paivio, 1971). Eight items tap into vi-
sual processing (e.g., ‘My thinking often consists of mental pictures or
images’) and seven items tap into verbal processing (e.g., ‘I enjoy
doingwork that requires theuse ofwords’) towhichparticipants are re-
quired to respond using ‘true’ or ‘false’. The outcomemeasure is a single
score, which was later criticised for being one-dimensional in nature.
Kirby,Moore, and Schoﬁeld (1988) adapted theVVQsuch that ten ques-
tions assess verbal preference, ten questions assess visual preference
and ten questions assess dream vividness (e.g., ‘My dreams are so
vivid I feel as though I actually experience the scene’). The revised
VVQ involves the calculation of responses to each of the three subscales.
5.5.6. Visualiser–Verbaliser Cognitive Style Questionnaire
This task assesses preference for using imagery as opposed to ver-
bal strategies when problem solving (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, &
Shephard, 2005). In Part I of the task, participants are required to
complete 11 written mathematical problems, taken from the Mathe-
matical Processing Instrument as described in Lean and Clements
(1981). An example problem is ‘In an athletics race, Jim is four feet
ahead of Tom and Peter is three feet behind Jim. How far is Peter
ahead of Tom?’ In Part II, participants are presented with a selection
of common strategies for completing each of the problems (e.g., ‘I
solved the problem by imagining Jim, Peter, and Tom running in an
athletics race’). Participants are asked to indicate as many of the cog-
nitive strategies provided that they utilised in solving each problem,
and to describe any further methods they had used.
5.5.7. Predominance of verbal and imagery-based thoughts visual ana-
logue scale (VAS)
Holmes, Mathews et al. (2008) developed three simple rating
questions to assess the use of imagery vs. verbal thought (i.e., bduring
the experimental task> ‘how much did you ﬁnd yourself thinking in
mental images’; ‘how much did you ﬁnd yourself thinking in words
or sentences’ and ‘howmuch did you ﬁnd yourself thinking in a man-
ner that neither seemed like mental images nor verbal thoughts’. Re-
sponses are made on a 9-point scale, from 1 ‘not at all’ to 9 ‘totally’. As
such, this measure allows the collection of convergent self-report
data alongside experimental data.
A variant of the task is described by Holmes et al. (2011) in which
participants were asked how much their thinking over the past seven
days has taken the form of mental images and then asked about ver-
bal thoughts. Responses to each are rated on a scale from 1 (“none of
the time) to 9 (“all the time”). Patients with bipolar disorder have
shown signiﬁcantly higher ratings on the imagery processing item
compared to healthy volunteers and in contrast, signiﬁcantly lower
ratings on the verbal processing item. This is comparable with similar
ﬁndings observed with the SUIS (Section 5.5.3).
5.5.8. Mental imagery interview
This is a semi-structured interview developed to explore the subjec-
tive experience, occurrence and content of mental imagery in healthy
volunteers and clinical populations (Day, Holmes, &Hackmann, 2004) in-
spired by early studies by AnnHackmann and colleagues (e.g. Hackmann,
Surawy, & Clark, 1998). Since being used in agoraphobia (Day et al.,
2004), the core interview has been adapted for use in a variety of clinical
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views are audio-taped, transcribed and coded post-interview.
The interview has been used to explore the frequency and nature of
images in social phobia (Hackmann et al., 2000) as well as other disor-
ders. Following provision of deﬁnition of mental imagery, participants
are asked to recall a social situation in which they felt anxious from ap-
proximately sixmonths prior to interview and are asked about associat-
ed images and the recurrence of such images. Participants then respond
to a series of questions relating to the sensory content, visual character-
istics, associated emotions, context and meaning of a typical social
phobia-related recurrent image from that time. The interview then pro-
ceeds to explore the relationship of that image to particular memories
through a series of questions. Finally, participants rate how similar
that image is to a particularmemory on a 0–100 scale in relation to sen-
sory and then interpersonal content. All participants reported recurrent
negative images, most of which were related to an adverse social event
occurring near to the time of onset of the disorder suggesting a relation-
ship with onset and maintenance of the disorder (Hackmann et al.,
2000).
An adaptation of the interview has been used to assess the relation-
ship between mental imagery and psychotic symptoms in schizophre-
nia (Morrison et al., 2002). Patients are asked to evoke a previously
experienced image and the content, occurrence and meaning of the
image, including associated emotions, memories and beliefs, are exam-
ined using the interview. Findings from Morrison and colleagues con-
ﬁrmed that the majority of patients (approximately 75%) experienced
mental images in relation to their delusions and hallucinations. Further,
most of these were recurrent and associated with affect, beliefs and
memories, suggesting a new avenue for mental imagery in understand-
ing psychosis.
The interview has also been used to explore the frequency and na-
ture of suicidal imagery in depression (Holmes, Crane et al., 2007).
The interview begins by deﬁning mental imagery and then a checklist
is used to assess the content of cognitions when participants were at
their most despairing. Participants then identify the most signiﬁcant
image they have experienced when at their most despairing/suicidal
and describe this in detail, and are asked about associated affect and
meaning. Distress and comfort are rated on scales from 1 “not at all”
to 9 “extremely” and participants also rate how real the images felt
and their preoccupations with the images, again using nine-point
scales. Results showed that all participants experienced intrusive, re-
current suicide-related images when at their most despairing, which
the authors termed “ﬂash-forwards” to suicide (replicated by Crane
et al., 2012; Hales et al., 2011). Hales et al. (2011) have further ap-
plied the interview to investigate imagery relating to suicidal cogni-
tions in both bipolar and unipolar patients (see Section 4.5.1).
5.5.9. Controllability of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
Developed and reported by Richardson (1994), this questionnaire as-
sesses the ability to visualise andmanipulate a given scenario in response
to set cues. Participants are asked a series of questions (e.g., “Can you see
a car standing on the road in front of a house”, then “Can you see bthe
car> climb up a very steep hill”). For each of the twelve items, partici-
pants respond with “yes”, “unsure” or “no”.
5.5.10. Observer vs. ﬁeld visual analogue scale (VAS)
This scale has been used to assess the perspective from which an
image relating to a previously experienced social situation is experi-
enced (Hackmann et al., 1998;Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). Perspec-
tive of the image is rated by the participant on a 7-point scale, ranging
from −3 (“ﬁeld perspective”) to +3 (“observer perspective”). Find-
ings in these two studies conﬁrmed that in contrast to healthy volun-
teers, individuals with social phobia typically adopt an observer
perspective in images of social situations, viewing themselves as if
from an external point of view. A variant of the scale is reported by
Stopa and Bryant (2004) who investigated the perspective of memoryand relation to self-concept. In this study, high and low socially-anxious
individuals reported memories of social occasions and designated the
perspective of these memories as “observer”, “ﬁeld”, or “neither”. In
comparison to previous ﬁndings, in this study both high and low anx-
ious participants predominately adopted a ﬁeld perspective, that is,
“as if seeing the situation through their own eyes”.
5.5.11. Evaluation of measures of general imagery use and experience
An important consideration when assessing mental imagery abili-
ty is whether to adopt objective or subjective measures. We recom-
mend where possible that both types of method are employed, as
they assess unique and separable dimensions of imagery ability.
Zeman et al. (2010) have reported a case of so-called “blind imagina-
tion” in which a patient who reported abrupt cessation of subjective
mental imagery was still able to perform normally on many standard
imagery measures. This suggests that performance on visual imagery
tasks can be dissociated from the phenomenological experience of visu-
al imagery itself. However, as discussed in Section 3.5, there are several
fMRI studies reported in the literature which have established a corre-
spondence between the subjective experience of imagery in different
modalities (i.e., imaging what something looks like, or sounds like)
and activation in brain areas that are associated with perceptual pro-
cessing in the same modality (Belardinelli et al., 2009; Huijbers et al.,
2011). The technique of ‘self-imaging’ (i.e., imagining an event from a
realistic and personal perspective) has also been shown to signiﬁcantly
enhance recognition memory in individuals who suffer from neurolog-
ical memory impairments (Grilli & Glisky, 2010).
There is an abundance of measures to assess the subjective experi-
ence of imagery and these have been used in a variety of disorders in-
cluding schizophrenia, depression and bipolar disorder, but the
selection of measures has not been applied consistently, either between
or within speciﬁc disorders. This has brought some interesting issues to
light. For example, two measures of vividness of imagery have been ex-
plored in schizophrenia (Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2), but conﬂicting ﬁnd-
ings led Bell and Halligan (2010) to suggest that if vividness of
imagery is indeed trait marker for schizotypy, it is only apparent when
imagery is assessed across several domains. Further, some subjective ac-
counts of imagery experience may not fall neatly into imagery or diag-
nostic categories (for example the experience of synaesthesia; Banissy,
Walsh, & Ward, 2009), but may nonetheless be a worthwhile target
for further research in clinical populations. We believe that subjective
experience presents an important aspect ofmental imagery assessment,
and that careful consideration of the aspect of interest in speciﬁc clinical
groups will best inform test selection in this area (see Table 2).
The Predominance of Verbal and Imagery-based Thoughts VAS
(Section 5.5.7) has been used with bipolar patients to demonstrate a
signiﬁcant predisposition towards imagery-based processing styles
(Holmes et al., 2011). The scale is short and simple to administer, and
can provide an effective method for initial investigation of imagery-
use in a clinical population. However, to date it has not been validated
to the same extent as other more established measures. We therefore
recommend that it be used in conjunction with either the VVQ
(Section 5.5.5) or the Visualiser–Verbaliser Cognitive Style Question-
naire (Section 5.5.6) which can provide more detailed complimentary
information on imagery and verbal processing styles.
Versions of the clinically orientated ‘Mental Imagery Interview’
(Section 5.5.8) have been used in several disorders, including social
phobia (Hackmann et al., 2000), agoraphobia (Day et al., 2004), de-
pression (Holmes, Crane et al., 2007), bipolar disorder (Hales et al.,
2011), chronic pain (Berna et al., 2011) and mental contamination
(Coughtrey, Shafran, Lee, & Rachman, 2012). We suggest that when
tailored to the speciﬁc disorder, the Mental Imagery Interview pro-
vides an appropriate methodology to investigate the occurrence, con-
tent and experience of mental imagery in clinical populations, and
generates information that can be useful as a therapeutic target. Re-
lated approaches have been used in obsessive-compulsive disorder
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McManus, Hackmann, & Williams, 2010; Wells & Hackmann, 1993).
We propose that exploring the role of imagery in these disorders,
and others which have been relatively neglected in this regard,
holds promise for future research and possible clinical innovation.
5.6. Measures to assess imagery re-experiencing phenomena and
intrusions/ﬂashbacks
5.6.1. Script-driven imagery procedures
These procedures are a clinical technique aiming to provoke symp-
tomatic PTSD responses. Participants are typically presented with
verbal scripts and asked to imagine the content. This procedure seems
to have developed from earlier work using generic scripts targeting com-
mon fears including snake phobia and performance anxiety (e.g., Lang,
Levin,Miller, &Kozak, 1983).More recently, scripts of previously obtained
individual narratives relating to an experienced traumatic event have
been used to investigate physiological responses and the effects of
pharmacological interventions administered post-trauma (Pitman et al.,
2002). Script-driven imagery techniques have also been adapted for use
in fMRI studies of PTSD (Lanius et al., 2001; Lanius et al., 2002; Rauch et
al., 1996; Shin et al., 1997) allowing the investigation of the neural corre-
lates of trauma response and re-experiencing phenomena.
5.6.2. Impact of Event Scale
The IES (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) is a self-report measure
anchored to a previously experienced traumatic event aiming to assess
avoidance and intrusive symptomatology. The Impact of Events Scale—
Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmer, 1997) was adapted to include a
hyperarousal subscale in order tomore closely reﬂect the PTSD diagnostic
criteria of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Exploration
of the properties of the scale in male Vietnam veterans conﬁrmed a
high internal consistency of the overall scale and high correlation be-
tween the IES-R and the PTSD Checklist (Weathers, Litz, Herman,
Huska, & Keane, 1993) but did not support the three-factor structure of
the measure (Creamer, Bell, & Failla, 2003). However, more recent re-
search in a sample of motor vehicle accident survivors conﬁrmed the
three-factor structure (i.e., intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal sub-
scales) as well as adequate internal consistency for each of the subscales
(Beck et al., 2008). The intrusion subscale is that most closely linked to
re-experiencing symptoms and thus intrusive imagery.
5.6.3. Intrusion triggering tasks
In line with the observation that real-life perceptual triggers may
result in ﬂashbacks in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al.,
2004), this laboratory-based methodology is designed to trigger in-
trusive images in healthy volunteers by presenting perceptual re-
minders of a previously experienced analogue stressful event, such
as a stressful ﬁlm (for reviews of the Stressful Film Paradigm see
Holmes & Bourne, 2008; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). Partici-
pants are presented with a series of neutral static images taken from
the stressful ﬁlm and are then asked to record the number of intru-
sions experienced under varying experimental conditions within a
set timeframe (e.g., Holmes, James et al. 2009; Holmes et al., 2010;
Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009).
5.6.4. Intrusion diaries
Tabular paper diaries have been used to record the frequency and
content of intrusive images as they occur in daily life (Davies & Clark,
1998; Holmes et al., 2004). Participants are asked to carry the diary
with them over a set period of time (e.g., over one week) and record
any involuntary intrusive images experienced as well as provide infor-
mation on the content. Intrusion diaries have been used in healthy vol-
unteers to record involuntary intrusions of a stressful ﬁlm (e.g., Bourne,
Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Butler,Wells, & Dewick, 1995; Davies
& Clark, 1998; Hagenaars, Brewin, van Minnen, Holmes, & Hoogduin,2010; Holmes, James et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2004; Krans, Naring, &
Becker, 2009; Pearson, 2012; Pearson, Ross, & Webster, 2012; Stuart,
Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). A variant of the intrusion diary has been
used clinically by therapists to record and detail traumatic “hotspots”
(detailed moments of peak emotional distress during a traumatic
event) in patients suffering PTSD (Holmes et al., 2005). This work has
shown that the majority of intrusions experienced in PTSD are also a
hotspot and that these are accompanied by a range of negative emo-
tions (Grey & Holmes, 2008; Holmes et al., 2005).
5.6.5. Intrusions interview
A structured interview investigating intrusive imagery in depression
has been developed by Patel et al. (2007) similar to the mental imagery
interviews described earlier (Section 5.5.8). Participants are asked to
report the total number of autobiographical depressive memories,
consisting of a visual image which had repeatedly come to mind over
the previous week. The two most frequent and distressing memories
are explored further in the interview. These memories are then rated by
the participant for emotionality, vividness, sense of “now-ness” and
re-experiencing, interference in daily activities, uncontrollability and dis-
tress using 0–100 rating scales. The same questions are then repeated for
intrusive images, deﬁned as a sensory representation of part of amemory,
without surrounding or context, or of an imagined event. Findings indi-
cated that approximately half the depressed patients experienced some
form of negative intrusive imagery, and that this interfered signiﬁcantly
with their everyday lives. See also Kuyken and Brewin (1994), Reynolds
and Brewin (1999) andWilliams and Moulds (2007).
5.6.6. Evaluation of measures to assess imagery re-experiencing phenomena
and intrusions/ﬂashbacks
The Impact of Event Scale (Section 5.6.2) and Intrusions Interview
(Section 5.6.5) both provide structured methods for evaluating a
patient's re-experiencing symptoms and frequency of trauma-related
intrusions. However thesemethods are dependent on a patient's ability
to accurately recall their previous image-based intrusions, and there-
fore may be prone to inaccuracy, bias, or non-disclosure of relevant in-
formation. Intrusion diaries (Section 5.6.4) may bemore effective as they
are typically completed for a longer time period. Again, however, the
quality of data collected from diaries is closely related to the degree of
compliance by participants with the experimenter/clinician instructions.
Script-driven imagery procedures (Section 5.6.1) and intrusion trig-
gering tasks (Section 5.6.3) confer the advantage of assessing intrusions
“as they happen”, but could be regarded as being less naturalistic than
intrusion diaries or interviews that focus on re-experiencing phenome-
na occurring outside of clinical or experimental sessions. Because
script-driven imagery procedures are based on verbal scripts and narra-
tives they may reﬂect linguistic processes that are not directly associat-
ed with re-experiencing phenomena and intrusions (Brewin, 2007). In
contrast, intrusion triggering tasks based on presenting perceptual re-
minders of traumatic experiences may more closely model the role
played by perceptual environmental cues in the onset of intrusions
and ﬂashbacks (see Brewin et al., 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
5.7. Measures to assess prospective imagery
5.7.1. Impact of Future Events Scale (IFES)
This is an adaptation of the IES-R (Section 5.6.2) created by
Deeprose and Holmes (2010), in which each item of the IES-R was
adapted to assess intrusive “pre-experiencing” and imagery of specif-
ic, future events. When the IFES was explored in a non-clinical sample
in relation to risk for bipolarity, IFES Total Score was positively asso-
ciated with risk for bipolarity (Deeprose, Malik, & Holmes, 2011). In
patients with bipolar disorder, signiﬁcantly higher IFES Total Scores
were found compared to healthy volunteers (Holmes et al., 2011).
Furthermore, when these bipolar patients were categorised into two
17D.G. Pearson et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 33 (2013) 1–23groups according to mood stability (stable vs. mood unstable), higher
IFES Total Scores were observed in the unstable group (Holmes et al.,
2011). Finally, higher IFES Total Scores have been observed for bipolar
patients when compared to unipolar depressed controls (Hales et al.,
2011). This overall pattern of data suggests that bipolar disorder is in-
deed associated with high levels of prospective intrusive imagery for
personal events (Holmes, Geddes et al., 2008).
5.7.2. Autobiographical memory and future cueing task
D'Argembeau et al. (2008) used an adaption of this task originally
reported by Williams et al. (1996) in the context of depression (see
Section 4.4). In the memory task, participants are asked to recall
events; in the future task participants are asked to imagine events
“that might reasonably happen to them” in the future. Both the mem-
ory and future task adopt a cueing procedure in which participants
are presented with short sentences (e.g., “a situation in which you
feel guilty about something”; “a situation in which someone smiles
at you”). D'Argembeau and colleagues used positive and negative
cues (although the original task reported by Williams and colleagues
also included neutral cues). Participants have 60 s to respond with a
speciﬁc event to each cue. Responses are audiotaped, transcribed
then scored. Findings indicated that the participants with schizophre-
nia recalled fewer past events and future events than healthy controls
and that these impairments were associated with the positive symp-
toms of the disorder. Interestingly, the patients with schizophrenia
were even more impaired in generating future events than past
events. However, it should be noted that the task does not necessarily
require that participants use imagery in order to respond to the cues
and thus it is possible that participants also used verbal strategies
rather than imagery in the generation of past and future events.
Williams et al. (1996) previously found that suicidal depressed
participants demonstrated impairment in generating images of the
future for all sets of cues (positive, negative and neutral) compared
to matched controls. This degree of impairment was found to corre-
late with the extent to which participants had difﬁculty in retrieving
speciﬁc autobiographical memories.
5.7.3. Prospective imagery task
This task requires participants to form mental images of future
events (Holmes, Lang et al., 2008; Stöber, 2000). Participants are pro-
vided with set cues of positive and negative scenarios (e.g., “You will
have a serious disagreement with your friend”, “You will do well on
your course”). In a study by Stöber (2000), non-clinical participants
rated each image for detailedness, speed and vividness using VAS. De-
pression scores were associated with decreased vividness of images
for positive future events. These ﬁndings were replicated by Holmes,
Lang et al. (2008) in which vividness ratings were provided on a scale
ranging from 1 (no image at all) to 5 (very vivid). Further, this study
compared performance in participants grouped by depression scores
and showed that high dysphoric participants reported more vivid neg-
ative prospective imagery and less vivid positive prospective imagery
than the low dysphorics. A study by Morina et al. (2011) conﬁrmed
poorer ability in clinically depressed patients to vividly imagine positive
future events using this task compared to healthy age and gender
matched controls.
Holmes et al. (2011) used a variant of the prospective imagery task
in bipolar disorder that utilised a six-point rating scale for the vividness
of each image from 1 (no image at all) to 6 (more vivid than reality)
(sixth point added based on pilot work speciﬁc to this disorder). This
study showed that compared to healthy controls, the bipolar group
had higher vividness of negative scenarios, but no difference was ob-
served between groups for positive scenarios (Holmes et al., 2011).
5.7.4. Evaluation of prospective imagery measures
The clinical literature points to the emerging importance of pro-
spective imagery across disorders. Prospective imagery has beenconsidered in relation to schizophrenia, depression and bipolar disor-
der, with intriguing ﬁndings. Imagery for the future is of particular clin-
ical interest, as ﬁndings from experimental psychology tells us that
imagining oneself completing a behavior may increase the likelihood
of that behavior being accomplished (Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, &
Slemmer, 2007). Thus the absence of positive imagery in depression
(Holmes, Lang et al., 2008;Morina et al., 2011) and the ﬁndings that de-
pression and bipolar disorder are associated with “ﬂash-forwards” to
suicide (Hales et al., 2011; Holmes, Crane et al., 2007) are especially
concerning (Holmes & Mathews, 2010) but may present viable targets
for innovative intervention.
Our review points to several measures for assessing prospective
imagery. Voluntary and involuntary cognitive processes can show in-
dependence (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), though see also
Rubin, Boals, and Bernsten (2008). The clinical literature highlights
the role of involuntary cognitions not only in PTSD but depression
and other disorders. It is thus important to distinguish between mea-
sures which reﬂect controlled, deliberate processes and those which
assess involuntary, intrusive cognitions. The Autobiographical Memo-
ry and Future Cueing Task (Section 5.7.2) and Prospective Imagery
Task (Section 5.7.3) are laboratory tasks which use standardised set
cues and require deliberate generation of responses (although note
the imagery requirements between the two tasks differ somewhat).
In contrast, the Impact of Future Events Scale (Section 5.7.1) attempts
to assess real-world personally relevant intrusive imagery. In the fu-
ture, diary methods may also be better developed. We suggest that
researchers should consider both deliberate and involuntary mea-
sures in order to fully evaluate prospective cognition in clinical
disorders.
5.8. Measures used to assess bias in imagery
5.8.1. Cognitive bias modiﬁcation task
A computerised cognitive bias modiﬁcation paradigm (CBM;
based on Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009;
Holmes et al., 2006) to explore the effects of imagery-based training
in schizophrenia is reported by Steel et al. (2010). This CBM paradigm
has been optimised to maximise the use of mental imagery. The task
begins with a brief imagery training session (Holmes & Mathews,
2005; Holmes et al., 2006) in which participants are asked to imagine
cutting a lemon in order to clarify what is meant by “using mental im-
agery” and complete practice examples of CBM training. During the
CBM training, participants are presented with auditory paragraphs
containing a scenario which is initially ambiguous but is ultimately
resolved in a positive way. For example: “You are walking down
your street and see a gang of children laughing. As you get nearer
you see what they are laughing at, and smile to yourself” (resolution
in italics). Importantly, the initial part of each scenario is ambiguous
and could also be resolved with a negative outcome (e.g. they are
laughing at you). Participants are required to generate mental images
of each scenario as though each one is happening to themselves. Thus
the aim is to train participants to use mental imagery to generate
positive resolutions when confronted with ambiguous information.
Change in interpretation bias is assessed by emotional valence ratings
of ambiguous test descriptions provided by participants both before
and after the CBM training. Although Steel and colleagues did not
demonstrate a signiﬁcant change in interpretation bias following
CBM in the overall sample, a signiﬁcant positive relationship was ob-
served between the self-rated use of imagery in everyday life provid-
ed by participants and change in interpretation bias. Thus participants
who had a higher tendency to use mental imagery in general were
more likely to develop a more positive bias through the CBM training,
highlighting the possible importance of trait mental imagery ability in
this regard.
Blackwell and Holmes (2010) explored the implementation of re-
peated CBM training in participants currently experiencing a major
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pants completed daily sessions of computerised CBM over a period
of one week at home. Findings showed that four of the seven partici-
pants demonstrated improvements in mood, bias and/or mental
health after one week. Findings were replicated in a larger sample
(Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012). This suggests
that the laboratory CBM technique to generate positive mental imag-
ery might hold potential for clinical translation to modify biases and
improve mood in depression.
5.8.2. Ambiguous sentences test
Reported by Berna, Lang, Goodwin, and Holmes (2011), this task
presents participants with 24 ambiguous scenarios. Participants are
asked to form a mental image of the scenario happening to them per-
sonally e.g. “You wake up, get out of bed, stretch, and really notice
how you feel today.” They then rate the image in terms of how pleas-
ant it is, from 1 “extremely unpleasant” to 9 “extremely pleasant”, and
how vivid their image is, from 1 “not at all vivid” to 7 “extremely
vivid. High dysphoric participants rated scenarios as less pleasant
than a low dysphoric comparison group, suggesting that this is a po-
tential measure of negative interpretation bias in depression.
5.8.3. Homograph interpretation task
Reported by Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, and Kintner (2003), this task
was subsequently adapted and used in depression (Holmes, Lang et al.,
2008). In this version, participants are asked to form a mental image
which includes themselves, based on homographs (e.g., “break” which
could be interpreted to mean either broken or rest). After providing a
brief description, participants then rate image vividness on a scale from
1 (not at all vivid) to 7 (extremely vivid) and image pleasantness from
1 (extremely unpleasant/negative) to 9 (extremely pleasant/positive).
Descriptions of the images are independently rated as positive, negative
or ambiguous, based on the context provided by the participant. Vivid-
ness and pleasantness scores are calculated separately for the positive
and negative responses. Themain ﬁndingwas that high dysphoric partic-
ipants provided lower pleasantness ratings of images generated in re-
sponse to homographs they interpreted as positive compared to low
dysphorics (Holmes, Lang et al., 2008).
On a shortened version of the task patients with bipolar disorder
reported signiﬁcantly fewer positive interpretations of the homo-
graphs and a trend towards signiﬁcantly more negative interpreta-
tions compared to healthy volunteers. However, when the patients
with bipolar disorder did generate positive interpretations on this
task, these images were rated as more vivid than those of the healthy
volunteers (Holmes et al., 2011).
5.8.4. Evaluation of measures of bias in imagery
There are a growing number of studies reported in the literature that
have demonstrated clinical importance for the interaction between imag-
ery and cognitive bias (e.g. Hirsch et al., 2006). Both the Homograph In-
terpretation Task (Section 5.8.3), and the Ambiguous Sentences Test
(Section 5.8.2) have foundperformance differenceswith participants suf-
fering from depression (Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011) and bi-
polar disorder (Holmes et al., 2011). The picture-word cue task, as used
by Holmes, Mathews, et al. (2008) similarly asks people to form amental
image combination of a ambiguous picture and an emotionally valenced
word and to rate the resultant emotionally valenced mental image.
Further development of tasks which may tap into the combination of
imagery and an emotional/cognitive bias may be useful in pinpointing
psychopathologies.
The application of computerised CBM training (Section 5.8.1) has
demonstrated signiﬁcant improvements from pre-treatment to post-
treatment in small scale studies of participants suffering from depres-
sion (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang et al., 2012). However, the
exact mechanism of change associated with CBM remains unclear. It
could increase the experienced frequency of positive imagery, changethe interpretation bias associated with imagery, or a combination of
the two. Lang et al. (2012) have suggested that participantsmay require
a certain baseline of mental imagery ability to gain from application of a
CBM paradigm. We suggest future research that examines CBM in con-
junction with measures of image generation (Section 5.1), inspection
(Section 5.3) and transformation (Section 5.4) will be valuable in help-
ing pinpoint the causalmechanisms associatedwith beneﬁcial effects of
imagery-based CBM training.
6. Closing remarks: a guiding framework
In this review of mental imagery research in clinical psychology
we have considered ﬁndings from PTSD, social phobia, schizophrenia,
depression and bipolar disorder. We have noted that studies across
disorders have rarely used the same measures and the selection of
measures has typically been driven by the phenomenology of the dis-
order in question. Unfortunately, this approach has made it difﬁcult to
compare the role of imagery across disorders or to select measures for
new research in a previously unstudied disorder. This highlights the
need for a guiding framework of the domains most relevant to mental
imagery research in clinical psychology.
A wide range of measures exist to assess the four stages of mental
imagery (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006) as reviewed in
Section 2. Our review of the clinical literature demonstrates that
these are very rarely utilised in clinical research but are a potential
source of valuable data. For example, it has been shown that de-
pressed patients are not impaired in image duration (Cocude et al.,
1997) but that general sensory/motor processing may be the locus
of impairment (Zarrinpar et al., 2006). The robustness of mental im-
agery per se provides a suitable basis for pursuing imagery as a treat-
ment target in this population, e.g., in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy
(Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009; Patel et al., 2007; Williams &
Moulds, 2007).
These ﬁndings support our argument that there may be aspects of
imagery associated with clinical disorders which may be informative
to consider from a cognitive point of view. For example, we have seen
that bipolar disorder is associated with high imagery use in line with
predictions (Holmes, Geddes et al., 2008). However, recent ﬁndings
from Pan et al. (2011) suggest that remitted bipolar patients show
deﬁcits in visuospatial working memory under high working memory
load conditions. How these cognitive deﬁcits relate to the phenome-
nology of imagery in bipolar disorder remains unexplored. This illus-
trates the need to further explore bipolar and other disorders in
relation to the experimental measures of imagery performance. We
suggest that in order to further understand imagery in clinical disor-
ders, we should explore the underlying cognitive processes based on
a theory-driven and experimentally informed approach.
In summary, we have proposed several key domains for mental im-
agery assessment in clinical research (see Table 4). This guiding frame-
work incorporates the ﬁndings from our review in relation to the
cognitive, subjective, and clinical measures of mental imagery, and
presents those domainswhichwe believe will be ofmost interest to cli-
nicians. The guiding framework highlights the broad domains shown to
be important in research to date. In selecting tests, considerationwill of
course need to be given to the speciﬁc disorder in question, as well as
the pragmatic issues related to using experimental tasks in any given
clinical population. For example, experimental tasks may need to be
adapted or shortened so as not to fatigue participants (e.g., Zarrinpar
et al., 2006). Speciﬁc groups of patients may need further adaptations
to themeasures proposed, such as in the case of neuropsychological im-
pairment (e.g., Bridge et al., 2012). It is also important when assessing
mental imagery with clinical populations that performance on more
than one imagerymeasure is examined at a time, and that performance
is compared with levels achieved by the same group on appropriate
control measure(s). This will help determine whether any observed
deﬁcit in task performance is driven by speciﬁc imagery impairment
Table 4
Summary of domains of mental imagery for assessment in clinical psychology.
Aspect of imagery Domain for assessment
Cognitive aspects of imagery Generation
Maintenance
Inspection
Transformation and manipulation
General imagery use and experience Experience, content, and occurrence
Controllability
Perspective
Imagery vs. verbal processing style
Clinical aspects of imagery Re-experiencing
Intrusions/ﬂashbacks
Prospective Imagery
Bias in imagery
19D.G. Pearson et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 33 (2013) 1–23ormore generalised cognitive dysfunction (see Section 4 for further dis-
cussion on this point).
We believe that thorough assessment of mental imagery as pro-
posed here by our guiding framework will help move forward our un-
derstanding of the underlying mental imagery processes across a
range of psychological disorders, and help drive forward advances
in both theory and treatment. We look forward to continued growth
and revision of such tasks, and the clinical questions concerning
where and why they might best be deployed, as this young ﬁeld con-
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